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INTRODUCTION
The treatment of Establishment Clause challenges to displays of reli
gious symbolism by the Supreme Court and the lower courts is notoriously
unpredictable: a creche is constitutionally acceptable if it is accompanied by
a Santa Claus house and reindeer, a Christmas tree, and various circus fig
3
1
2
ures, but unacceptable if it is accompanied by poinsettias, a "peace tree,"
4
or a wreath, a tree, and a plastic Santa Claus. A menorah may be displayed
5
next to a Christmas tree, or next to Kwanzaa symbols, Santa Claus, and
7
6
Frosty the Snowman, but not next to a creche and a Christmas tree. A
number of commentators have suggested that this disarray can be blamed
largely on the chaotic state of the Supreme Court's Religion Clauses doc
trine. 8
Since the 1980s the Supreme Court has recognized that the public dis
play

of religious symbols may, in some circumstances, violate the
9
Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court's guidance as to when such a
display will violate the Establishment Clause has been vague, however; in
applying what has come to be known as the "endorsement test," the Court
has essentially declared that public displays of religious symbols are im
10
permissible if they convey a message of endorsement of religion. Yet,

I.

Lynch v. Donnelly,

2.

County of Allegheny v.ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,

465 U.S.668, 67 1 , 679-85 ( 1 984).
598-600 ( 1 989).

3.

ACLU v.County of Delaware,

726 F. Supp. 1 84, 1 89-90 ( S.D.Ohio 1 989).

4.

Amancio v. Town of Somerset,

28 F. Supp. 2d 677, 678, 68 1 ( D.Mass. 1 998).

5.

Allegheny, 492 U. S.at 6 1 4-20 (plurality opinion).

6.

ACLU v. Schundler,

1 68 F.3d 92, 95, 107 (3d Cir. 1 999).

7.
( 1 997).

ACLU v. Schundler,

1 04 F.3d 1435, 1438, 1446-50 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1 265

Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60
7 1 3, 722-26 (200 1 ); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 15, 1 1 7-34 (1 992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illu·
sions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276-301
( 1 987); cf Mark Tushnet, T he Constitution of Religion, 1 8 CONN.L.REV. 70 1 , 701--02 (1 986) (dis·

8.

See, e.g.,

Mo. L. REV.

cussing the "disarray" of the Court's religion cases).

9.

U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion ...."). The first Supreme Court case to consider the constitutionality of a display of reli
gious symbolism was

Stone

v.

Graham, 449

U.S. 39

( 1 980). Stone was a brief, per curiam opinion

holding unconstitutional a Kentucky law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools. Id. at

4 1-43. Because the opinion included very little reasoning to explain that result, the
1 984 case of Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.668 ( 1 984), may perhaps be seen as the true starting point

for the Court's religious symbolism jurisprudence. The Supreme Court revisited some of the issues
albeit not in public schools, last Term in Van Ord.en v. Perry, 1 25 S. Ct. 2854 (plu
(2005) (upholding constitutionality of Ten Commandments Display on the grounds
of the Texas State Capitol) and McCreary County v. ACLU, 1 25 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (holding uncon
raised by

Stone,

rality opinion)

stitutional a Ten Commandments display on the walls of two county courthouses).

10.

In its two most recent cases involving religious symbols-specifically the Ten Com

mandments-the Supreme Court did not explicitly apply the endorsement test, but its analysis in
those cases was functionally the same as the endorsement test analysis. In McCreary County, the
Court held that two counties' display of the Ten Commandments in their courthouses evinced a
religious purpose and therefore violated the Establishment Clause. 1 25 S. Ct. at

2745. This holding

December 2005]

Putting Religious Symbolism in Context

493

beyond stating that it is necessary to examine the context of the display, the
Supreme Court has failed to provide a satisfactory way of determining what
message a given religious symbol or set of symbols actually conveys. This
failure has led to a widely recognized inconsistency, confusion, and appar
ent subjectivity in the Supreme Court and lower court cases dealing with
public displays of religious symbolism.
This Article draws upon linguistic theory to explain why the task of dis
cerning the meaning of a display of religious symbolism has proven so
unmanageable. In particular, it draws on the branch of linguistic theory
known as "speech act theory," as well as some postmodern critiques of, and
11
elaborations on, speech act theory. The defining feature of speech act the
ory, as I use the term here, is that it emphasizes the effects of linguistic
utterances and the contextual features that give rise to those effects, rather
than the intent behind the utterances. These features of speech act theory
make this branch of linguistic theory particularly relevant to the analysis of
meaning in religious symbol cases, because the endorsement test is similarly
concerned primarily with the (endorsing) effect of religious symbolism and
with the contextual features that may create or negate an endorsement effect.
Approaching the endorsement test through the lens of speech act theory
leads to the conclusion that any constitutional test that is concerned with
determining the "meaning" of religious displays will ultimately fail to pro
duce a stable, predictable jurisprudence. This is because meaning, in those
cases, must rely on the context of the display, yet context, itself, is inher
ently unstable, elusive, and incapable of formulation into clear legal rules.
Moreover, the difficulties stemming from the endorsement test's reliance on

is consistent with the endorsement test, which includes a purpose prong. Cf Russelburg v. Gibson
County, No. 3:03-CV- 1 49-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2 1 75527, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005) (noting
that the Court in McCreary County "affirmed the lower courts' use of the Lemon test"). In Van Or
den, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion did not apply any particular test but instead looked to "the
nature of the monument and . . . our nation's history." 1 25 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion). Justice
Breyer, whose concurrence provided the necessary fifth vote, also did not apply the endorsement
test but engaged in a fact-intensive, contextual analysis to discover whether a religious message was
conveyed by the display. Id. at 2868-70 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). This analysis was
functionally almost identical to the endorsement test. In the wake of Van Orden, lower courts have
applied the endorsement test or a similar contextual analysis to Establishment Clause challenges to
religious symbols. See, e.g., ACLU Nebraska Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 4 1 9 F.3d 772, 776 (8th
Cir. 2005); O'Connor v. Washburn Univ., 4 1 6 F.3d 1 2 1 6, 1 224 (10th Cir. 2005).
The Supreme Court has occasionally applied the endorsement test outside the context of reli
gious symbols, in cases where the alleged governmental support for religion was primarily symbolic
or intangible rather than financial. See, e.g., Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305- 1 0
(2000) (applying the endorsement test t o student-led prayer a t a high school football game); Rosen
berger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va. , 5 1 5 U.S. 8 19, 837-46 ( 1 995) (applying the endorsement test to
funding by state university of a proselytizing religious student organization); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 ( 1 993) (applying the endorsement test to use of
school facilities by a religious organization).
1 1 . I employ the term "speech act theory" for simplicity, but it is both underinclusive and
overinclusive as I use it here. The theory of language set out in this paper draws most heavily on the
writings of John Searle and J.L. Austin, while, in the interest of conciseness, ignoring many nuances
of, and qualifications to, speech act theory elaborated by other important theorists. This paper also
draws heavily on the writings of Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish, and Jonathan Culler, which com
ment on, and are influenced by, Austin, but which may best be understood as fitting under the
general rubric of poststructuralist or postmodernist theory, rather than of speech act theory per se.
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context are aggravated in cases involving religious symbolism by two fac
tors: first, the absence of any meaningful role for the potentially stabilizing
element of subjective intent in the vast majority of religious symbol cases;
and second, the diversity of religious perspectives, accompanied by an ex
treme lack of societal consensus regarding the appropriate degree of
governmental acknowledgement of religion.
This critique of the endorsement test is unique in its linguistic focus and
in its emphasis on the specific problem of context. Unlike most existing cri
tiques, the analysis set out in this Article suggests that the indeterminacy
and unpredictability in the application of the endorsement test are not a re
sult of doctrinal incoherence, thinly veiled politics, or unconscious bias;
rather, they are inherent in the problem of attempting to determine the social
meaning of symbolic government action against the backdrop of extreme
viewpoint plurality, without the potentially stabilizing element of subjective
intent to guide the inquiry. This approach thus differs from existing critiques
of the endorsement test, which have primarily focused on the problematic
construct of the "reasonable observer," established by the Court as the per
spective from which the meaning of a symbolic act or display is to be
.
12
JU dged .

Additionally, because this critique reveals difficulties inherent in any

highly context-dependent inquiry into meaning, it may suggest a more gen
eral critique of attempts to build a jurisprudence based on the symbolic
dimensions of government action. Such attempts have been the focus of the
philosophy known as "expressivism," which has been the subject of intense
13
scholarly consideration in recent years. This Article is thus primarily an
argument about one aspect of Establishment Clause doctrine; at the same
time, however, it is situated within the literature on "expressivism" and "so
cial meaning," examining the extent to which the central hermeneutic
questions raised by those strains of thought have gone unanswered in the
literature, just as they have in the specific context of the endorsement test.
Nonetheless, this Article does not intend to question-as several recent and

12.
See infra Part II. But see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DoN'T WISH ME A MERRY
CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 246-82 (1997); Steven
D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 Mo. L. REv. 506 (2001);
Smith, supra note 8.
13. The first presentation of an expressive theory of law is Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990). Pildes and Anderson later articulated the theory most fully
in Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) [hereinafter Anderson & Pildes, Expressive Theories]. In 2001, the
Maryland Law Review sponsored a symposium on expressivism, which featured a number of fine
articles on the subject. Symposium, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philoso
phical and Legal Perspectives, 60 Mo. L. REV. 465 (2001). Several articles have applied
expressivism to specific issues or doctrinal areas. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federal
ism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule?, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1309 (2000); Deborah
Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000). For a critique
of expressivism, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000).
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1
important commentaries have done 4-whether it is truly meaningful to un

derstand the government to be "sending messages," whether it is accurate to
view official action as having "expressive dimensions," or whether it is

proper for Establishment Clause doctrine to be concerned with governmen
tal "messages"; instead, this Article assumes that, at least in the narrow class

of cases dealing with public displays of religious symbols, the endorsement
test's focus on the symbolic or "expressive" harm caused by religious sym
bols

is entirely appropriate.

In other words, whatever the merits of

expressivism generally, this Article takes the position that the religious sym
bolism cases, with their near-exclusive focus on symbolic or stigmatic harm,
15
are the paradigmatic cases for applying the expressivist model.

Part I of this Article introduces the endorsement test through a summary

of the two principal Supreme Court cases dealing with religious symbols,

11
16
Lynch v. Donnelly and County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, as well as of Capitol
18
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, a case involving a religious
symbol on public property in which the Court did not apply the endorsement

test. Part I notes, and seeks to explain, the relatively insignificant role played

by subjective intent in the endorsement test as it has been applied by the
Supreme Court. Part II reviews the existing critiques of the endorsement test

and one prominent defense of it-namely, the expressivist approach. Part III
sets out the theoretical framework that this Article contends is most useful to

understanding the failures of the endorsement test: speech act theory and its

postmodern elaborations. It also explains in greater detail why these theories

are relevant to the endorsement test. Part III leads to the central conclusion

of this Article, which is that the instability and unmanageability of the en

dorsement test are attributable to its inevitable dependence on context. Part

I V then demonstrates how the Supreme Court has struggled with context in
its religious symbol cases. Finally, in Part V, this Article asks whether the

problem of context can ever be satisfactorily resolved and, concluding that it

cannot, proposes an incremental change that would help to regularize and
rationalize the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area.

I. THE SUPREME COURT ' S ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
UNDER THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
A. Lynch, Allegheny, and Capitol Square
The two key Supreme Court cases establishing the test for determining

the constitutionality of religious symbols are Lynch v. Donnelly and County

of Allegheny v. ACLU. In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Supreme Court considered
,

14.

A sharp and careful critique of expressivism was laid out in Adler, supra note 13; see

15.

See infra text accompanying note 91.

also Smith, supra note 12.
16.

465 U.S. 668 (1984).

17.

492 U.S. 573 (1989).

18.

515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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the constitutionality of a nativity scene erected by the City of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island as part of a Christmas display. According to the opinion of the
Court, written by then-Chief Justice Burger, the display comprised, in addi
tion to the creche at issue in the case,
many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christ
mas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling
Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout fig
ures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear,
hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that read[] "SEASONS
19

GREETINGS."

After conducting a historical review of the various ways in which the
government has officially acknowledged religion or celebrated religious
holidays in America, the majority found that the display, "viewed in the
0
proper context of the Christmas Holiday season," was constitutional. 2 In
particular, the Court stated that the display did not represent an attempt by
the government to advocate for one particular religion, but rather merely
celebrated the national holiday and depicted the historical origins of Christ
mas; as a result, the Court found that a secular purpose animated the display,
that the display did not have the effect of impermissibly advancing religion,
and that it did not lead to excessive entanglement of religion and govern
ment. 21
Although the majority did not apply the (as yet unformulated) "en
dorsement test" in Lynch, Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, outlined the
analytical framework that would come to be known as the endorsement test.
She concluded, for her part, that in this particular context, surrounded by
secular symbolism and understood as part of a larger government celebra
tion of the holiday season, the creche did not represent a governmental
endorsement of religion.22 She then set forth the endorsement test, which,
she stated, requires a determination whether the challenged display "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community."23 In determining

19.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 67 1 .

20.

Id. at 680.

2 1 . Id. a t 680-85. The majority i n Lynch thus applied the Establishment Clause test set out
by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 ( 1 97 1 ), according to which a governmental act is
unconstitutional if it has a primarily religious purpose or effect, or if it results in excessive entan
glement between religion and government. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
22.

Lynch, 465 U.S at 694 (O'Connor, 1., concurring).

23. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). O'Connor's articulation of the endorsement test
would also require a finding of unconstitutionality if the challenged government conduct conveys a
message of disapproval of religion. Id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). The Court has not yet
had occasion to apply this aspect of the endorsement test, however, and it has largely been ignored
by commentators. It is likewise not discussed in this Article. But cf O' Connor v. Washburn Univ.,
4 1 6 F.3d 1 2 16, 1221 ( 1 0th Cir. 2005) (considering an Establishment Clause challenge to a sculpture
displayed at a public university, on the ground that the sculpture conveyed disapproval of the Roman
Catholic Religion).
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the meaning conveyed by a display under the test, Justice O 'Connor ex
plained, courts should examine both what the government "intended to
communicate" and "what message the . . . display actually conveyed"; these
subjective and objective components of the message correspond to the pur
pose and effect prongs of the Lemon test.24
In County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, the Supreme Court considered the con
stitutionality of two different displays. The first was a creche scene, which
the county had permitted a private religious group to place on the "Grand
Staircase" of the county courthouse during the Christmas holiday season.25
In addition to the creche itself, the display included a wooden fence sur
rounded by red and white poinsettias, two small evergreen trees decorated
with red bows, and an angel holding a banner inscribed with the words
6
"Gloria in Excelsis Deo."2 The exhibit was accompanied by a sign that read,
7
"This Display Donated by the Holy Name Society."2 Each year the county
sponsored a Christmas carol program, which was performed against the
backdrop of the creche scene. 28
The second challenged display was an eighteen-foot-tall menorah, also
owned by a private group, which was placed outdoors at the entrance to a
government building, next to a forty-five-foot-tall Christmas tree owned by
the city. 29 At the foot of the Christmas tree was a sign that read, "Salute to
Liberty," and then continued: "During this holiday season, the city of Pitts
burgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the
3
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom." 0
In a set of fragmented opinions, the Supreme Court in Allegheny held
that the creche display violated the Establishment Clause, whereas the me
31
norah did not. Although a majority of the Court signed on to Justice
Blackmun's application of the endorsement test to declare the creche display
unconstitutional, there was no majority rationale for finding the menorah
constitutional.
The most important aspect of the A llegheny case for purposes of this Ar
ticle is the Justices' emphasis on the importance of context in determining
whether the creche display had the effect of endorsing religion. While as
serting that "[t]here is no doubt . . . that the creche itself is capable of
3
communicating a religious message," 2 the Court proceeded to examine the
physical setting of the display to determine whether such a message actually

24.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

25.

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 ( 1 989) (plurality opinion).

26.

Id. at 580 (plurality opinion).

27.

Id.

28.

Id. at 581 (plurality opinion).

29.

The Christmas tree itself was not challenged as violating the First Amendment.

30.

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 582 (plurality opinion).

3 1 . Id. at 601 --02; id. at 6 1 9 (plurality opinion); id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring only in judgment on the menorah).
32.

Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
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was conveyed. Because this creche, unlike the creche that was found to be
constitutional in Lynch v. Donnelly, was displayed alone, without any coun
tervailing secular symbols that might help to negate the endorsement effect,
the Court found that it did, in context, endorse Christianity. The Court also
pointed out that the poinsettia "frame" surrounding the creche, "like all
good frames, serve[d] only to draw one's attention to the message inside the
frame. The floral decoration surrounding the creche contribute[d] to, rather
than detract[ ed] from, the endorsement of religion conveyed by the
33
creche." Thus, in Allegheny, the Court relied on the physical context of the
religious symbol to determine that it had the effect of endorsing religion,
whereas in Lynch, it had found that certain contextual features-that the
display was surrounded by a Santa Claus, several reindeer figures, and other
relatively secular elements-gave it a primarily secular, non-endorsing effect.
Similarly, in evaluating the constitutionality of the menorah, Justice
Blackmun's opinion emphasized the presence of the Christmas tree nearby,
which made the display into a generic holida� celebration, rather than a sec
tarian Jewish display celebrating Chanukah. Justice Blackmun also noted
that the sign saluting liberty further detracted from any possible inference of
endorsement.35 Finally, drawing on the historical context to better under
stand the meaning of Chanukah, Justice Blackmun pointed out that
36
Chanukah, like Christmas, had both secular and religious dimensions; in
Justice Blackmun's view, this fact further lent credibility to the notion that
the display was a nonsectarian holiday tribute rather than a governmental
endorsement of religion. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, argued that
the menorah is "the religious symbol of a religious holiday," thus disagree
ing with Justice Blackmun's emphasis on the secular aspects of Chanukah,
but nonetheless found the menorah display to be constitutional based on
37
largely the same contextual factors that Justice B lackmun had highlighted.
Both Justices Blackmun and O' Connor agreed that it is the perspective
of the "reasonable observer" that must be taken into account in determining
whether a given display conveys a message of endorsement. 38 As Justice

33. Id. at 599. T he frame had this effect, in part, because poinsettias are the "traditional
flowers of the [Christmas] season." Id.
34.

Id.

at

614-18 (plurality

35.

Id.

at

619 (plurality opinion).

36.

Id.

at

61 3-20 (plurality opinion).

37.

Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

38.
U. S. 48 1 ,

opinion).

Id. at 620 (plurality opinion) (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474
493 (1 986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice

Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, also emphasizing contextual factors but not ex
actly applying the endorsement test, argued that the menorah display was unconstitutional. Id. at

640--43

(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices

Marshall and Brennan, wrote separately to express his view that there should be a presumption
against the display of religious symbols on public property.

Id.

at

646-55

( Stevens, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Scalia, rejected the majority's endorsement approach altogether in favor of an approach that
considers whether the display coerces or proselytizes; Justice Kennedy argued that both displays
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O' Connor later formulated it, the concept of the reasonable observer is in
tended to reflect the fact that the Establishment Clause is concerned with
"the political community writ large"; as such, the endorsement inquiry does
not focus on "the actual perception of individual observers," but on a kind of
39
idealized reasonable person. This idealized person is assumed to know the
religious meaning of the symbol at issue, whether the property where it is
situated is public or private, and how the relevant forum has historically
been used.40
But how, in practice, is one to determine or prove what the reasonable
observer would perceive? Justice O' Connor has stated that the question
whether the government has endorsed religion, while it may be partly eluci
dated by evidentiary submissions, is "in large part a legal question to be
1
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts."4 She has
therefore emphasized that the endorsement test should not focus on real in
,.1
dividuals, "who naturally have differing degrees of knowledge.' 2 Thus, the
reasonable observer's perception is not to be gleaned merely from surveying
individuals in the community; beyond this, though, it is not easy to say how
a judge is to put herself in the position of the reasonable observer. One can
only conclude, perhaps, that one element of the "context" to which the en
dorsement test looks is the understanding or consensus of the society as a
whole.
The result in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, an
other recent case examining the constitutionality of a religious symbol on
public property, did not depend on application of the endorsement test, but
all of the Justices still considered whether the relevant symbol, in its particu
lar physical context, conveyed an endorsement of religion. In Capitol
Square, the Supreme Court considered whether the Establishment Clause
was violated by the display of an unattended cross by a private group in a
3
traditional public forum, near the seat of government.4 The Latin cross at
issue was erected by the Ku Klux Klan in Capitol Square, "a 10-acre, state
owned plaza surrounding the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio."44 The Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board, which was charged with regulating
public access to the forum, had initially denied the Klan a permit to erect the
structure in Capitol Square, because it believed that to allow erection of the
were constitutional under a "proselytizing" approach. Id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
39. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 51 5 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1 995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The objective observer may thus be
analogized to the "reasonable person" in tort law. The difference, however, is that the "reasonable
observer" is a device for interpreting symbols, not for determining what is negligent or nonnegligent
conduct.
40.

Id. at 780-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

41 .

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1 984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 779 (O' Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in
42.
judgment).
43.

Id. at 757.

44.

Id.
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cross would result in an Establishment Clause violation.4s The Board thus
justified its content-based prohibition of the Klan's symbolic speech with its
claimed compelling state interest of complying with the Establishment
6
Clause.4 While apparently recognizing that the Supreme Court had previ
ously determined, in Lamb 's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
4
1
Distri d and Widmar v. Vincent, 8 that no Establishment Clause violation
results when the state permits private religious speech in a true public fo
rum, the Board had argued that in this case, the proximity of the forum to
the "seat of government" might lead to the perception that the cross was
sponsored by the state; a message of endorsement therefore might be con
veyed if the cross were permitted.49
The Court disagreed with the Board's reasoning, holding that that the
so
Board had violated the Klan members' free speech rights. In so conclud. ing, a plurality of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, categorically stated that private reli
gious speech in a true and properly administered public forum cannot
violate the Establishment Clause, no matter what the proximity to the tradi
tional seat of government or the likelihood of "mistaken" perceptions of
s
government endorsement of religion by observers. 1 Justice O 'Connor, by
contrast, would have applied the endorsement test even in the context of
private religious speech in a public forum, but she concurred in the judg
ment on the ground that no inference of endorsement was reasonable, given
s
the public forum context. 2 Justice O' Connor opined that, because the "rea
sonable observer" should be presumed to know that the forum at issue was
traditionally a public forum, open to all comers, that observer would not
perceive an endorsement of religion in the City's decision to allow the Klan
to use the space on the same terms as all other groups; she declined, how
ever, to join the categorical assertion that there would be no set of
circumstances under which private religious speech in a public forum could
s3
violate the Establishment Clause.

45. Id. at 758-59. The lower courts had found Capitol Square to be a traditional public forum, and the Supreme Court appeared to accept that finding. Id. at 759, 761.
46.

Id. at 761.

47.

508 U.S. 384 (1993).

48.

454 U.S. 263 (1981).

49.

Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 763 (plurality opinion).

50.

Id. at 770 (plurality opinion).

51.

Id. (plurality opinion).

52.

Id. at 772-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

53. Id. at 776-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As an ex
ample of a case in which private religious speech in a public forum could violate the First
Amendment, O'Connor stated that "a private religious group may so dominate a public forum that a
formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of approval," and then went on to
suggest, somewhat vaguely, that "the fortuity of geography, the nature of the particular public space,
or the character of the religious speech at issue" might result in an impermissible endorsement ef
fect. Id. at 777-78.
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Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented.54 Justice Stevens believed that a
message of endorsement was conveyed by the cross display due to the
cross 's proximity to the seat of government and the nature of unattended
religious symbols on public property, which are easily taken to be supported
by the government entity that controls the property.55 Justice Ginsburg simi
larly found that the unattended nature of the cross near the statehouse, in the
6
absence of a sufficient disclaimer, created an inference of endorsement.5
Although the result in Capitol Square did not involve an application of
the endorsement test,57 the central question in the case, and the dispute
among the Justices, still revolved around whether the symbol of the cross, in
its particular physical context, connoted an endorsement of religion. Thus,
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, essentially held that the public forum
context always negates any possible message of endorsement that might
58
otherwise be derived from private religious speech on public property. The
concurrence and dissent, on the other hand, rejected the majority's per se
rule but differed in whether they viewed the particular features of the physi
cal context in the case at hand as supporting or negating an inference of
governmental endorsement of religion.
59
Finally, in Van Orden v. Perry, decided last Term, the Supreme Court
did not explicitly apply the endorsement test to a display of the Ten Com
60
mandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. Instead, disavowing
the appropriateness of any particular test, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
plurality, stated that the display had to be considered in light of "the nature
of the monument and . . . our Nation's history" of official acknowledgement
61
of religion. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, providing the fifth
6
vote to uphold the display. 2 In his concurrence, he also declined to apply the

54.

Id. at 797-815 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

55.

Id. at 800--02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

56. Id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Breyer, argued that although the City was not within its rights in denying the Klan a permit, the City
could have more appropriately accommodated both Establishment Clause concerns and free speech
concerns by requiring a disclaimer or erecting its own disclaimer making it sufficiently clear that the
City did not endorse the message of the cross on its property. Id. at 793-94 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
57. Five justices in Capitol Square-some in concurrence and some in dissent-did, how
ever, apply the endorsement test. Id. at 773-83 (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter, J., and Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id at 786-94 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); id. at 799-803, 807-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 764-65 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989), which also involved private speech, but not in a public forum).
59.

125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion).

60.
See id. at 2859-64. McCreary County v. ACLU, the companion case to Van Orden, struck
down two Ten Commandments displays on the ground that "the reasonable observer could only
think that the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments' religious message."
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2738 (2005).
61.

Id. at 2861 (plurality opinion).

62.

Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).

502

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:491

endorsement test, but he analyzed the display in light of the physical and
historical context in order to determine whether a religious or secular mes
sage was conveyed-an analysis that is functionally equivalent to the
63
endorsement inquiry.
B. The Role of Intent in the Religious Symbol Cases
In outlining her version of the endorsement test, Justice O'Connor ex
plained that a display may violate the Establishment Clause if it has the
effect of endorsing religion (or a particular religion), or if the government
has the intent of endorsing religion in erecting or permitting the erection of
64
the display. As Justice O' Connor observed in Lynch:
[F]or [some listeners] the message actuall y conveyed may be something
not actually intended. If the audience is large, as it always is when gov
ernment "speaks" by word or deed, some portion of the audience will
inevitably receive a message determined by the "objective" content of the
65
statement, and some portion will inevitably receive the intended message.

For those who receive the former message, in other words, it seems no less
accurate to say that that message is the "meaning" of the display. A demon
strable intent on the part of government actors to endorse religion may thus
render a display unconstitutional, but the absence of religious intent will not
be dispositive.
In practice, however, the role of intent in deciding the religious symbol
cases has been decidedly minimized. When the Supreme Court held the
creche display unconstitutional in Allegheny, and when lower courts have
held religious displays to be unconstitutional, they have usually done so
based on the display's effect-the message "actually conveyed" by the dis
66
play-and not based on the message the display was intended to convey.

63.

Id. at 2868-70 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).

64. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e must exam
ine both what [the government] intended to communicate in displaying the creche and what message
the city's display actually conveyed.").
65.

Id.

William M. Howard, Annotation, First Amendment Challenges to Display of Religious
Symbols on Public Property, 107 A.L.R. 5th I,§§ l l[b], 12[b], 13[b], 1 5[b], 16[b] (2003) (collect
66.

ing cases). A notable exception is the line of Ten Commandments cases, which have often been
decided on purpose grounds, perhaps due to the influence of Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
In Stone, the first Ten Commandments case decided by the Supreme Court, the Court held the dis
play of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms to be unconstitutional due to a lack of
secular purpose. Indeed, the Court might be understood to have implied in that case that any unac
companied display of the Ten Commandments would have an inherently religious purpose. Id. at
4 1 -42 (noting that this was not a case in which the study of the Ten Commandments was integrated
into a secular curriculum and that "(t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us
to that fact"). More recently, the Court struck down a Ten Commandments display as manifesting a
religious governmental purpose in McCreary County, 1 25 S. Ct. at 2745.
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There are most likely a number of reasons for the de-emphasis on sub
7
jective governmental intent in the religious symbol cases.6 When discussing
religious displays, it is usually difficult to talk about subjective intent in any
meaningful way. First, as several other commentators have pointed out, it
often seems strange, if not completely pointless, to talk about the intent of
"the government," a body that is in fact composed of a variety of individuals
who often have different and even conflicting motivations-indeed, some of
those individuals might themselves have multiple motivations for acting as
68
they do. In the context of religious symbol displays, in particular, there is
rarely even a written record of any such motivations, or anything akin to the
legislative history from which courts may attempt to discern the purposes of
those displays.69 Second, even if there were such a record, a jurisprudence
that focuses on governmental intent may invite officials to disguise or revise
their "true" motives in order to create the appearance that they are acting in
7
accordance with constitutional standards. 0 Third, as Steven Smith has lu
cidly pointed out, the question of what a given government official
"intended to communicate" by her actions is often simply unanswerable: by
passing legislation or approving a permit, an official often does not intend to
communicate anything at all-she intends to effect a particular state of af
fairs. "Indeed," Smith argues, "it seems more plausible to think of legislators
and executive officers as wielders of power than as mere senders of mes
sages, and thus as primarily concerned with the substantive consequences of
their acts rather than with the messages which such acts may happen to
71
communicate." Fourth, courts and commentators have pointed out that
67.
The problems created by a jurisprudence based on intent have been explicated by many
commentators. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Smith, supra note 8, at 284-86 (summarizing the "standard" prob
lems inherent in requiring an inquiry into intent in constitutional law).
68. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 1 3 , at 1 389 ("[L]egislatures, courts, agencies, and other legal
institutions do not possess mental states, independent of the mental states of the persons that make
up these institutions."); Ely, supra note 67, at 1212-14; Smith, supra note 8, at 284.
69.
A rare but salient counterexample would be the recent decision of former Chief Justice
Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court to place the Ten Commandments in the courthouse. See
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1286--87 (1 1 th Cir. 2003). Indeed, cases involving Ten Com
mandments displays, in contrast to those involving other religious symbols, often tend to center on
the purpose of the governmental actors in espousing, permitting, or requiring the display. See, e.g.,
McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2737-4 1 ; Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O' Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 77 1 -72
(7th Cir. 200 1 ) ; Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 302--04 (7th Cir. 2000).
Another case involving demonstrable governmental intent to endorse religion is Doe v. Small,
934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 199 1 ), vacated, 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (reversing the district
court's injunction as overbroad but not reversing the finding of unconstitutionality). In that case, the
City Council of the City of Ottawa, Illinois officially passed a resolution stating, with respect to a
privately owned religious holiday display, "NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City
Council of the City of Ottawa . . . that the Council endorse the activities of the Ottawa Jaycees in
maintaining, erecting, dismantling, and storing" several large religious paintings that constituted the
holiday display. Id. at 760. Unsurprisingly, the Seventh Circuit court of appeals found that the city's
actions constituted an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. Id. at 746.
70.

See, e.g., Ely, supra note 67, at 1 214-15; Smith, supra note 8, at 284-85.

71.
Smith, supra note 8, at 286-87. One could, of course, counter that in the case of religious
symbol displays, it is hard to imagine what "substantive result" a government official could have
intended, other than conveying a particular message through the use of symbols.
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some legislators are religious individuals, and that those individuals are of
ten motivated to act, at least in part, in accordance with their religious
beliefs; to suggest that legislation is unconstitutional merely because it is in
part reflective of those religious beliefs is thus, in a sense, to deny religious
7
individuals the right to participate in public life. 2
Finally, the nature of religious displays, as physical structures often
73
standing alone and thus "left to speak for themselves," dictates that the
subjective intent of the party responsible for the symbol will figure less into
the interpretive equation than it does when one is trying, for example, to
interpret meaning in the context of a face-to-face conversation. Although all
of the Supreme Court cases dealing with religious symbols illustrate this
principle, perhaps the most striking example is Capitol Square. In contrast
to Justice Scalia's insistence that "mistaken" perceptions-even reasonable
74
ones-were not relevant to the Establishment Clause analysis, the concur
ring and dissenting Justices argued that the privately owned religious
symbol on public property strongly lent itself to an inference of endorse
ment, irrespective of whether the government intended to endorse religion or
merely to maintain a public forum, because it stood alone-because, as Jus
tice Ginsburg said, " [n]o human speaker was present to disassociate the
religious symbol from the State," and because there was no other accompa
nying sign or symbol to elucidate its meaning.75 In other words, the
concurrences and dissents suggest that, in interpreting the meaning of a bare
symbol, without any indicators of the motive or mindset of the party respon
sible for it, subjective intent is simply less relevant, not to mention less
discernible.
Indeed, the very fact that Capitol Square was treated as a case involving
a religious symbol at all demonstrates that subjective intent is relatively un
important in religious symbol cases. The Latin cross at issue in that case
was erected by the Ku Klux Klan, and the governmental actors involved
were naturally aware of the Klan's sponsorship. Accordingly,1the cross was
undoubtedly more a symbol of a political viewpoint than of religious belief.
Justice Thomas, the only Justice to discuss this fact in any detail, noted that,
while he agreed with the majority's decision due to the way in which the
case was presented-as an Establishment Clause case-the message of the
76
cross was primarily political, not religious. In fact, Justice Thomas demon72.
See, e.g., Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 8, at 743 & nn.152-53 (citing Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987), and McConnell, supra note 8, at 144).
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 51 5 U.S. 753, 801 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
73.
dissenting).
74. Id. at 763--69 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 787 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (criticizing Justice Scalia's opinion on the ground that "[u]nless we are to
retreat entirely to government intent and abandon consideration of effects, it makes no sense to
recognize a public perception of endorsement as a harm only in that subclass of cases in which the
government owns the display").
75.
Id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 78�7 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); id. at 801--02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76.

Id. at 770-72 (Thomas, J. concurring).
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strated through a brief recapitulation of the history of the symbol that the
connotations of the cross, as used by the Klan, were only marginally reli
77
gious. The subjective intent of the Klan members who erected the cross on
Capitol Square was not predominantly religious at all. In Capitol Square,
subjective intent was thus arguably irrelevant in determining the meaning of
the symbol, and to some extent, "mistaken" interpretations of it were indeed
relevant-otherwise, it would be inexplicable that even Justice Scalia, in his
plurality opinion, was willing to treat the cross as a religious symbol for
purposes of the constitutional analysis.
Intent is therefore far less central to the task of discerning the meaning
of religious displays than it is for discerning what one's conversation partner
means in a face-to-face discussion, or perhaps even for understanding the
legislative intent behind a statute based on its legislative history. As a result,
context-the only other guidepost the Supreme Court has given to tell us
how religious displays should be interpreted-comes to play a much more
78
important role than intent in the religious symbolism cases.
One might object that intent is always involved in discerning meaning,
and in some sense this is true, though it is not the kind of subjective intent
that I am referring to here. Whenever the government is understood to be
sending a "message," it must be understood to have the intention of convey
ing that message. Similarly, Searle explains:
When [someone] takes a noise or a mark on paper to be an instance of lin
guistic communication, as a message, one of the things that is involved in
his so taking that noise or mark is that he should regard it as having been
produced by a being with certain intentions. He cannot just regard it as a
79
natural phenomenon, like a stone, a waterfall, or a tree.

Indeed, according to one widely accepted understanding, to "mean" some
thing is simply to intend that one's utterance cause the listener or reader to

77. Id. (explaining that the cross was primarily associated with cross burning, which was a
tool of intimidation, and that, although the cross briefly took on some religious significance, it was
primarily a nonreligious symbol of hate).
78. Again, there is always a counterexample. In Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 8 1 2 F.2d
687 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1987), several city residents sued under the Establishment Clause to enjoin the City's
use of a seal containing the word "Christianity" in its official stationery. The issue was whether the
plaintiffs had standing to sue. Although the plaintiffs had come into contact with the seal through
official mailings from the city, the city argued that the plaintiffs Jacked standing, because the word
"Christianity" was smudged and therefore illegible in the form in which it appeared on all the city
stationery. The district court, reasoning that the plaintiffs could not be injured by the word if they
could not read it, agreed that the plaintiffs did not have standing. The court of appeals reversed,
however, stating that "the fact is that the word is still part of the seal." Id. at 691 . The court contin
ued, "[t]he fact remains that the word 'Christianity' with all of its connotations is part of the official
city seal, and these appellants are reminded of that fact every time they are confronted with the city
seal-smudged or not smudged." Id. at 692. In this case, the subjective intent of the individual who
wrote the word "Christianity;' or who placed it on the city seal, controlled the meaning of the
smudge. Otherwise, it would be incoherent to state that an illegible smudge could cause injury to the
plaintiffs' right to be free from governmental endorsement of religion.

79. J.R. Searle, What Is a Speech Act?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 39, 40 (J.R.
Searle ed., 1 97 1 ); see also Paul F. Campos, This Is Not a Sentence, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 97 1 , 977-78
( 1995).
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understand or recognize what one intends to say.

80

Thus, since the endorse

ment inquiry focuses on determining what the display "means"-that is,
what the viewer of the display would understand the intention of the gov
ernment

to

be

when

it

erected

the

display-this

"constructed"

or

hypothesized intent is involved in the endorsement inquiry. Yet this audience
construction of the government speaker's intent is not the same as the gov
ernment speaker's actual, subjective intent. As Jamin Raskin has explained,
"The question is not whether the decisionmaker, in his or her own mind,
intended to endorse religion, but whether the government has [erected a]
display that can most plausibly be understood as having the purpose and
81
function of endorsing religion." This question, of course, is answerable
82
primarily by reference to the display's context. This understanding of in
tent (commonly referred to as purpose, rather than intent) corresponds to the
objective meaning of a display, or the message "actually conveyed" by a
display-as opposed to the subjective message, or the message intended to
83
be conveyed-in Justice O'Connor's terminology.

II. EXISTING CRITIQUES (AND ONE PROMINENT DEFENSE)
OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
The endorsement test in general and the approach taken by the Court in
the religious symbol cases in particular have been repeatedly criticized in
what has become a large and diverse body of legal scholarship. These cri
tiques

primarily

take

the

Court

to

task

for

the

subjectivity

and

unpredictability of the endorsement test, arguing that "the test provides few
clear guidelines, and appears to turn on judges' inevitably subjective as
sessments of a hypothetical reasonable observer's perceptions about the
84

cultural significance of state practices."

As Jesse Choper has set out in a recent article,

85

the inherent subjectivity

and unpredictability of the endorsement test have been criticized primarily
on two grounds. The first focuses on the heuristic of the "reasonable ob
server," noting that this imaginary construct is too easily manipulable, with
80.
PAUL GRICE, Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, in STUDIES IN
THE WAY OF WORDS 1 1 7, 1 23 (1989) [hereinafter GRICE, Utterer 's Meaning]; H.P. Grice, Meaning,
66 PHIL. REv. 377, 377-88 ( 1 957). As Grice has stated, "intensionality seems to be embedded in the
very foundations of the theory of language." GRICE, Utterer 's Meaning, supra, at 1 37; see also
JoHN R. SE ARLE, SPEECH AcTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 43 { 1 969).
8 1 . Jamin B. Raskin, Polling Establishment: Judicial Review, Democracy, and the Endorse
ment Theory of the Establishment Clause-Commentary on Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REv.
7 6 1 , 764 (200 1 ).
82.

Id.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). One might also
add that this corresponds to the "sentence-meaning," rather than the "speaker's meaning" of the
display, to use Gricean terminology. See, e.g., GRICE, Utterer's Meaning, supra note 80, at 1 24-26.
83.

84.
David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment
Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 559, 584 (2002).
85.
(2002).

Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & PoL. 499
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the result of each case depending largely on the characteristics and knowl
86
Commentators have also criticized the

edge attributed to that personage.

Court for largely failing to identify whether the reasonable observer is a

member of the religious mainstream or a religious minority or atheist, argu
87
ing that the outcome of a given case usually turns on this distinction. Some

have noted that the reasonable observer heuristic, as applied, tends to em

body a majoritarian perspective and therefore favors majority religions over
88
minority religions. The second line of criticism takes issue with the notion
that courts should be asking the endorsement question at all, arguing that the
symbolic injury on which the endorsement test is centered should not con

stitute constitutionally cognizable injury, or that the injury involved-the

injury to individuals' sensibilities-is too subjective to produce a meaning
8
ful and predictable jurisprudence. 9

An account of the criticisms of the endorsement test would not be com

plete, however, without a counterbalancing description of what might be

considered a prominent line of scholarship defending that doctrine. Indeed,

it would be almost impossible to discuss the religious symbolism cases, in
0
particular, without making reference to expressivism.9 With its focus on the

meaning, or symbolic dimension, of government conduct, expressivism
naturally has much to say about the precise problem raised by public dis

plays of religious symbols.

Expressivism, as a branch of constitutional theory, has been much dis

cussed, elucidated, critiqued, and even subjected to "general restatement" in

recent years, and it is not my intention here to replicate the extremely useful
1
work of other scholars.9 Moreover, while I suggest that this Article may

have some critical implications for expressivism generally, I accept expres

sivism's overall approach, as it applies to religious symbol cases, because I

86.
Id. at 5 10-2 1 ; see also Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause,
1 994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 478-82.
87.
Choper, supra note 85, at 5 1 1 ; Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 8, at 7 1 9-20; William
P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 495, 536-37 ( 1 986).
88.

See, e.g., Gey, supra note 86, at 48 1 .

Choper, supra note 85, at 521-35; Smith, supra note 8, at 305-1 3 ; cf William P. Mar
89.
shall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J.
351, 356-66 (199 1 ) (criticizing the notion that offense to individual sensibilities is relevant to the
Establishment Clause by analogizing to the Court's treatment of offense in the free speech context,
but arguing that the endorsement test is not actually concerned with offense to individual sensibili
ties).
90.
Not all defenses of the endorsement test arise from the expressivist line of scholarship;
indeed, the array of scholarly defenses of the endorsement test is at least as diverse as the criticisms
of it. See, e.g. , Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality:
Justice O 'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 837, 845 n.38, 847-5 1 (200 1 ) (defending the endorsement test's focus on equality and citing
other sources defending it on similar grounds); Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Govern
mental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40
DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 80-83 (1990) (praising the endorsement test for its emphasis on "political
standing" but suggesting that its application could be clarified).
91.

See sources cited supra notes 13 and 14.
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believe that its tenets have forceful application for the specific, narrow doc
trinal problem of public displays of religious symbolism. Because the stakes
in such cases are largely, if not solely symbolic, expressivism is, as ex
plained further below, a uniquely suitable tool for analyzing the doctrine in
this area. Defending expressivism beyond its application in this area is out
side the scope of this Article, however, since my focus here is specifically on
the problem of how the meaning of religious symbols is actually to be de
termined-a problem that in my view has not received sufficient attention
from courts or commentators.
Expressivism is concerned with the notion that conduct can have "ex
pressive" dimensions-that is, that "actions speak."92 In the realm of
constitutional theory, it has been argued that certain constitutional provi
sions are aimed in part at regulating the expressive dimensions of
government conduct.93 This expressive dimension of conduct is often re
ferred to as "social meaning," which can be defined as "the semiotic content
attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular con
text."94 The term "social meaning," as it is used in the literature, often
appears to refer to the connotations of a law or official action-as opposed
to the literal meaning of the language of the official directive itself-and it
usually involves the expression of values or attitudes, as opposed to other
sorts of messages.95 The term usually also entails a notion of societal con
sensus-the notion that certain conduct is generally understood to carry
certain meanings within a particular social context.96
Perhaps most famously, several commentators have discussed the case
97
of Brown v. Board of Education in terms of social meaning, pointing out
that legalized segregation was so offensive to notions of equality in large

92. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON. VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcONOMICS ( 1 993) (articulating
a theory of "expressive rationality"); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean ?, 63 U.
CHI. L. REv. 59 1 , 597 ( 1 996) ("Actions have meanings as well as consequences."); Cass R. Sun
stein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 202 1 , 2021 ( 1 996) ("Actions are
expressive; they carry meanings."). The expressivist school of thought has been associated with
scholars such as Elizabeth Anderson, Deborah Hellman, Dan Kahan, Charles Lawrence, Lawrence
Lessig, Richard Pildes, and Cass Sunstein, among others.
93.
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 755 ( 1 998) ("Public policies can violate

the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs but because the meaning they
convey expresses inappropriate respect for relevant constitutional norms."); Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 506-07 ( 1 993). But see Smith,
supra note 1 2, at 5 10-14 (questioning whether government actions send messages in any meaning
ful sense); id. at 5 1 9-23 (questioning the normative claims of expressivism).

94.
( 1 995).
95.

Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 95 1

See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, Expressive Theories, supra note 13, at 1504.

96. ANDERSON, supra note 92, at 25; Lessig, supra note 94, at 958-59 ("It is not enough that
individuals understand that a particular idea along with a given action may yield a given meaning.
For it to function as a 'social meaning,' the individuals in this context must also accept it."). This
concept of societal consensus is discussed further below.
97.

347 U.S. 483 ( 1 954).
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part because it connoted the inferiority of African Americans-in other
98
words, because of its "social meaning." Of course, if racial segregation had
existed within a social context in which the balance of political and social
power between blacks and whites were reversed, segregation could be un
derstood as signifying just the opposite: the inferiority of whites. Thus, the
social meaning of segregation was dependent upon the social and political
context. And, at least by the time Brown was decided, there was a broad so
99
cietal consensus regarding what segregation "meant" in that social context.
The treatment of religious displays under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment is perhaps the prototypical case in which the expres
00
sive dimensions of law, or of official action, are of central concern.1 In
analyzing religious displays under the endorsement test, the Court considers
whether the government has endorsed religion-that is, whether the chal
lenged display "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu
w
nity." 1 The endorsement test is thus primarily concerned with the social or
w2
cultural meaning of the religious display.
Expressivist scholars make both descriptive and normative claims about
w3
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The descriptive claim is
that government actions often express certain values, whether intentionally

98.

Charles Black was perhaps one of the earliest constitutional commentators to speak of

Brown explicitly in terms of "social meaning." See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 42 1 , 424-27 ( 1 960) (discussing the "social meaning" of segre
gation); see generally Adler, supra note 1 3 , at 1 370 n.32 (citing sources discussing expressivist

theories for the antidiscrimination principle). Proponents of the "colorblindness" theory of equal
protection might not agree with this view, however. They would instead argue that the offensiveness
of segregation stemmed from the mere fact that government classified individuals on the basis of
race. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200, 240 ( 1 995) (Thomas, J. concur
ring).
99.
That consensus probably existed much earlier, of course. As Justice Harlan pointed out in
his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.S. 537 ( 1 896), even in 1 896, "[e]very one kn[ew]
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from
railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned
to white persons." Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); cf Raskin, supra note 8 1 , at
774-75 (describing Justice Harlan's statement as a "nineteenth century way of stating that any rea
sonable person would understand [conveying a message of racial inferiority] to be the objective
purpose and function of segregation").
100.
The first scholar to recognize that the religious symbol cases implicate social meaning
appears to be Charles Lawrence. See Charles R. Lawrence ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 17 , 359 ( 1 987); see also Pildes &
Niemi, supra note 93, at 5 1 1 -1 3 .

IOI.

Lynch v . Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 ( 1 984) (O'Connor, J . , concurring).

102.
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 93, at 5 1 2; cf Smith, supra note 8, at 286 (noting that the
endorsement test "does not ask simply what government intended; it asks what government intended
to communicate"); Smith, supra note 1 2, at 5 1 9 ("In her 'endorsement' opinions, Justice O'Connor
argued that the constitutionality of a law under the Establishment Clause should depend not so much
on the material effects of the law, but on what 'message' the law sends . . . . ).
"

103.
See Anderson & Pildes, Expressive Theories, supra note 1 3, at 1 506-07, 1 5 20-27;
Smith, supra note 1 2, at 5 10; see also Adler, supra note 1 3 , at 1 376-77 (noting that expressive theo
ries of law are primarily normative or moral).
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or not, and that these expressions can have very real effects on social rela
104
tionships.
The normative claim, put simply, is that courts should attend to

these value expressions and that, indeed, what a law expresses may render it

unconstitutional, regardless whether any of its tangible or material effects
0'
are constitutionally troubling. 1
106
One could consider William Marshall's much-cited article
defending

the Supreme Court's focus on the symbolic aspects of government action to

be an early precursor to the expressivist line of defense of the endorsement
107
test.
Professor Marshall has argued that, difficult though they may be to
answer, the endorsement test asks exactly the right questions in Establish

ment Clause cases. He has defended the "symbolic" approach-the Court's

focus on the message sent by government conduct--on the grounds that it
most accurately and consistently describes the Court's Establishment Clause

decisions and that it allows for accommodation of important competing in

terests, such as recognition of our cultural heritage, free exercise, and free
speech rights, better than other understandings of the Establishment
108
Professor Marshall has proposed dealing with the interpretive dif

Clause.

ficulties and subjectivity inherent in the symbolic approach through a

jurisprudence that espouses different perspectives-that of the ardent sepa

rationist, the accommodationist, or somewhere in between-depending on
the particular context in which the Establishment Clause issue arises. Mar

shall's approach thus recognizes that "similar actions convey different
109

meanings depending on the context in which they arise."

More recently, David Cole has argued for an "expressivist model of the
1 10
Espousing the view that government-sponsored

Establishment Clause."

religious messages are more constitutionally problematic than material aid
11
to religious entities, 1 Cole argues that the constitutionality of faith-based

1 04.

Anderson & Pildes, Expressive Theories, supra note 1 3, at 1506--0 7, 1520-27.

105. Id. ; Smith, supra note 1 2, at 5 1 9-23. There are variations on expressivism not captured
by this very rough sketch; for example, as Steven Smith has pointed out, Cass Sunstein and Law
rence Lessig appear to espouse a more consequentialist version of expressivism, asserting that
government messages and the perception of those messages by individuals are among the effects of
government action that should be taken into account in evaluating that action. Id. at 52 1-22 & n.49
(citing Lessig, supra note 94, and Sunstein, supra note 92, at 2047). Expressive theories of law have
typically been subjected to the most criticism when they appear to claim that, despite net positive
"material" consequences, a law might be invalidated because of its nonmaterial, nonconsequential,
expressive dimensions. Professor Smith takes issue with this notion, for example. Id. at 522-23. In
the religious symbolism cases, however, it seems that the "expressive" dimension of government
conduct is the only one involved-there are generally no (or negligible) material consequences to
the government's decision to erect a holiday display. I would therefore contend that expressivism is
less problematic as applied to those cases.
106.

Marshall, supra note 87.

1 07.

Steven Smith views it as such. Smith, supra note 1 2, at 508.

1 08.

Marshall, supra note 87, at 522-32.

109.

Id. at 550.

1 1 0.

Cole, supra note 84, at 559.

1 1 1 . Id. at 585-86 (citing KENNETH L . KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS
OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 148-49 ( 1 993), and Ira c. Lupu,

December 2005]

Putting Religious Symbolism in Context

511

social services funding programs should be judged according to whether
11
they express government approval of religion. 2 He then suggests some gen
eral principles by which endorsement can be identified in the government
.
11
fundmg context. 3
Defenders of the expressivist approach to the Establishment Clause es
sentially argue that government actions convey messages of some sort-that
is, they have social meanings. They further contend that those messages
matter for purposes of constitutional doctrine, and may constitute constitu
tionally cognizable injuries. The expressivists have not, however, given
more than cursory attention to the question of how those messages can be
114
deciphered. Since I have accepted the validity of expressivism as applied
to the problem under consideration here, my focus in this Article is on the
largely unaddressed problem of deciphering social meaning from mute reli
gious symbols.
III. THE EXPRESSIVE AND THE PERFORMATIVE:
SPEECH ACT THEORY AND BEYOND

A. Speech Act Theory and Its Relevance
While constitutional doctrine and theory have become increasingly con
cerned with the fact that conduct can have expressive dimensions-that is,
that actions speak-in the field of philosophy of language, one of the central
insights of the past half-century has been that language has "performative"
dimensions-that is, that language acts. Traditionally, philosophers had
conceived of language as describing states of affairs in a way that was sub
ject to verification and thus as primarily consisting of statements, which
were either true or false.115 More modern philosophers of language such as
Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the
Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 77 1 , 773 (200 1 )).
1 1 2.

Id. at 583-86.

Cole argues that, in a government program that is itself a form of speech, an appearance
of endorsement will occur if religious entities are funded to engage in "government speech" but not
if the government is simply funding private speakers, some of whom are religious entities, on a
viewpoint-neutral basis. Id. at 587-93. With respect to nonspeech programs, he contends that en
dorsement may arise if the program, while formally neutral, is structured so that religious entities
receive the majority of the benefits or so that the government directly funnels money to religious
entities rather than allowing a private individual to spend the money on services offered by religious
entities. Id. at 593-600.
1 1 3.

1 1 4. But see Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 8, at 736-60 (proposing that social meaning
be determined through survey data and expert testimony, as consumer perceptions are proven in
trademark cases). A few scholars outside the expressivist vein have focused somewhat on this prob
lem. See, e.g., Feigenson, supra note 90, at 94-101 (arguing, by analogy to defamation law, that
whether government action conveys an impermissible message should be determined by whether
any "segment" of the community that is not "totally irrational" actually perceives such a message);
Frank S. Ravitch, Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2005
or 2006).
1 1 5 . See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 1-4 (J.0. Urmson ed., 1 962). Austin
calls the view of language as describing states of affairs "the 'descriptive' fallacy." Id. at 3.
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J .L. Austin and John Searle, however, began focusing on the fact that lin
guistic utterances often do not describe something, but rather do something:
for example, to say, "I promise you I will be there," is not to describe a state
of affairs but to perform an act-namely, the act of promising. 1 1 6 Such utter
ances, called "performatives" or "speech acts," are evaluated not in terms of
their meaning (what they describe or refer to) but rather in terms of their
force (what they accomplish). 1 11 As such, they are not true or false but rather
successful or unsuccessful: to take a classic example, it would be meaning
less to describe the utterance "I do [take this woman to be my lawfully
wedded wife] " as true or false. To utter those words is to perform an act (the
act of marrying), not to describe (accurately or inaccurately) a state of af
8
fairs. 1 1 That utterance could be unsuccessful, however. Under certain
circumstances or in certain contexts, it could fail to bring about the result it
purports to achieve, for example, if the speaker is already married to some
one else, the words are not spoken before the proper state or religious
official, or the words are spoken in a play.1 19 Thus, one objective of speech
act theory is to specify the context that must exist for a performative utter
0
ance to be successful. 12
Speech act theory is a useful lens for critically viewing the endorsement
inquiry in religious symbol cases for a number of reasons. First, the en
dorsement test is concerned not with the truth or falsehood of the messages
conveyed by symbols but rather with effects-with the capacity of govern
ment conduct to stigmatize or endorse certain types of persons or
behaviors. 121 This is similar to speech act theory's focus on the "successful
ness" or "unsuccessfulness" of speech acts rather than on the speech acts'
ability to describe a state of affairs. Furthermore, both speech act theory and
the endorsement test, as applied in the religious symbol cases, focus on the

1 1 6.

See id. at 4-6; Searle, supra note 79.

See AUSTIN, supra note 1 1 5, a t 99-100. Initially, Austin contrasted these "perforrnative"
1 17.
utterances with "constative" utterances, which supposedly do describe or refer to a state of affairs.
Ultimately, however, Austin concluded that the distinction between performative and constative is
illusory. Rather, the constative is merely a subset of the performative. See generally id. at 94- 1 20.
A familiar example of this concept can be found in the "verbal act doctrine" in the law of
1 1 8.
evidence. "Verbal acts" are not considered to be hearsay because they are not admitted for their truth
or falsity, but rather because they demonstrate that a certain act was performed. For instance, an
offer to sell something at a particular price that might otherwise be inadmissible hearsay could be
offered into evidence, not to show that the person actually intended to make a sale for that price, nor
to show that the sale was actually consummated, but rather to show that an oral contract was
formed. See, e.g., 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801 .5 (4th ed.
1 996); 30B MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7005 (4th ed. 2000) .
1 1 9.

This example is taken from AUSTIN, supra note 1 1 5 , at 5, 15-17.

1 20.

See SE ARLE, supra note 80, at 4 1 -42.

Cf Lessig, supra note 94, at 958-59 (describing the stigmatizing "force" of some mes
121.
sages in certain contexts); Sunstein, supra note 92, at 2047 ("[W]ithout desirable effects on social
norms, there is not much point in endorsing expressively motivated law."); cf Lessig, supra note 94,
at 1 036-39 (discussing the possibility that messages will help to construct the reality they describe).
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1 22

recognizing that the force and efficacy of certain
messages derive from their being uttered under certain conditions, when
13
certain requirements are met. 2 What follows from this is that, as discussed
above with respect to the endorsement test, the role of the speaker's subjec
tive intent is de-emphasized. As Jonathan Culler explains, describing one
basic principle of speech act theory:
If in appropriate circumstances I say "I promise to return this to you," I
have made a promise, whatever was running through my mind at the time,
and conversely, when earlier in this sentence I wrote the words "I promise
to return this to you" I did not succeed in making a promise, even if the
thoughts in my mind were similar to those that occurred on an occasion
when I did make a promise.

124

The speech act of promising, then, depends not on the speaker's intent
125
but primarily on the context in which certain words are spoken. Addition
ally, it is worth noting that endorsing is one kind of speech act or
performative utterance-that is, according to the classic definition of a
speech act, endorsing is an act that may be performed by (or in) saying
. 16
somethmg. 2
There is a final reason why it is appropriate to ,analyze displays of reli
gious symbols in particular-as opposed to other governmental actions that

1 22. Throughout this Article, the term "utterances" is used in a very broad sense to encompass
linguistic communication as well as nonlinguistic communication (in the form of expressive conduct
and of symbols).
123. Lessig, supra note 94, at 958-6 1 ; see also JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION:
THEORY AND CRITICISM AFfER STRUCTURALISM 1 1 1 ( 1 982) ("What makes an utterance a command
or a promise or a request is not the speaker's state of mind at the moment of utterance but conven
tional rules involving features of the context.").
1 24. CULLER, supra note 123, at 1 1 1 . Similarly, theorists of social meaning have downplayed
the relevance of subjective intent in discerning the expressive content of conduct, especially gov
ernment conduct. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan
Redistricting: A Comment on the Symposium, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2537-47 (1997) (discussing why
motive should be irrelevant in gerrymandering cases, which are largely concerned with the expres
sive effect, or social meaning, of certain forms of redistricting); Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended
Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 975 (1991); Smith, supra note 1 4,
at 5 1 0-1 1 . But see ANDERSON, supra note 92, at 33 (asserting that expressive norms are intentional).
For example, a law that imposes only a fine rather than imprisonment as the punishment for com
mitting murder would express disrespect for the victims of those crimes, whether or not the
government intended this disrespect; the purpose of the law might simply be to increase revenues,
but this purpose is not capable of dictating or exhausting the social meaning of the law. See Kahan,
supra note 92, at 620-24. Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes have recently backed away from
this nonintentionalist view, however, arguing instead, in a recent article, for a concept of collective
intention in government action. Anderson & Pildes, Expressive Theories, supra note 1 3 , at 1 520-27.
1 25 . One might analogize to the "objective theory of contract formation and interpretation,"
according to which "the intentions of the parties to a contract or alleged contract are to be ascer
tained from their words and conduct rather than their unexpressed intentions." Joseph M. Perillo,
The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 427, 427 (2000).
1 26. See Searle, supra note 79, at 39 ("Some of the English verbs and verb phrases associated
with illocutionary acts [i.e., speech acts) are: state, assert, describe, warn, remark, comment, com
mand, order, request, criticize, apologize, censure, approve, welcome, promise, express approval,
and express regret." (emphasis added)).
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may unconstitutionally create an inference of governmental endorsement of
7
religion, such as, for example, school-sponsored prayer12 or the use of pub
128
lic school facilities by a religious after-school club -using the tools of
speech act theory, as if those symbols were linguistic utterances. Linguistic
theory may be a useful tool for analyzing the religious symbol cases because
erecting a display of holiday symbols in a public place is usually a purely
symbolic act. Since it rarely implicates the expenditure of any meaningful
sum of public funds, for example, it tends not to have any potential effects
beyond that of simply expressing governmental approval of religion. In
other words, in cases involving religious symbolism, the only relevant ques
tion is what the symbolic display means, in a rather literal sense, since
symbolic displays generally do not do anything other than convey a message
1
or attitude. 2 The only real harm caused by the displays seems to be sym
130
bolic in nature. Indeed, even one prominent critic of the endorsement test
agrees that in cases involving challenges to religious symbolism, the ques
tion whether a message of governmental endorsement of religion has been
.
3
conveyed 1s the correct one.1 1
For all of these reasons, the perspective of speech act theory is a useful
one for approaching the interpretive problems posed by the endorsement
test, with its attention to the expressive dimensions of government conduct,
and particularly in the narrow set of cases pertaining to public displays of
religious symbols.
B. The Dependence of Meaning on Context, and the
Inability of Context to Delimit Meaning

Explaining one of J.L. Austin's central insights in delineating a theory of
speech acts, Jonathan Culler states:
to mean something by an utterance is not to perform an inner act of mean
ing that accompanies the utterance. . . . What makes an utterance a
command or a promise or a request is not the speaker's state of mind at the
moment of utterance but conventional rules involving features of the

text.

132

1 27.

See, e.g., Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).

1 28.

See, e.g. , Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001 ).

con

CJ W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3 1 9 U.S. 624, 632 ( 1 943) ("There is no doubt
1 29.
that . . . the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of commu
nicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or
personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.").
1 30.
This conception of the religious symbol cases, however, is not beyond dispute. Frank
Ravitch espouses a very different understanding of the effect of government-sponsored religious
symbolism. Ravitch, supra note 1 1 4; see generally Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on
the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV.
439 (2004) (setting forth a theory of government facilitation of religion). Ravitch theorizes that the
governmental connection lends power to the symbol, and hence to the religion.
131.

McConnell, supra note 8 , at 155.

1 32.

CULLER, supra note 1 23 , at 1 1 1 (emphasis added).
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Particularly when the speaker's subjective intent is inaccessible to us, am
biguous, or otherwise irrelevant, 133 we look to the context of the utterance
for some conventional features that will help us identify its meaning and
thereby construct for ourselves what we believe to have been the speaker's
134
intent.
Context, however, is itself an extremely unstable device for discerning
meaning. Although meaning is dependent on context, it is usually impossi
ble to fully describe or delimit the relevant context: "Meaning is context
bound, but context is boundless." 135 As Culler proceeds to explain, context is
13
boundless in two senses. First, context can always be further specified. 6
This idea is familiar to lawyers: indeed, it is inherent in the exercise of dis
tinguishing precedent. For example, in Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 137 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the City of Syracuse's creche dis
play passed Establishment Clause muster, because, like the constitutionally
permissible creche in Lynch and unlike the impermissible creche in A lle
138
gheny, it was surrounded by several secular holiday symbols. The dissent,
however, would distinguish Syracuse's display from the display in Lynch on
the ground that in Lynch, "a single park display contained numerous festive
secular decorations," whereas in the Elewski case, most of the secular deco
139
rations were at some distance from the creche. Thus, the dissent further
specified the context by highlighting an element of it that the majority had
found irrelevant: the physical distance between the religious and secular
decorations.
Context is boundless in a second way as well. As Culler explains, "any
attempt to codify context can always be grafted onto the context it sought to
describe, yielding a new context which escapes the previous formulation." 140
1 33. The deconstructionist view would argue that the quality of inaccessibility or displace
ment always characterizes the subjective intent that is supposed to give meaning to an utterance, but
it is not necessary to delve into the truth or falsity of that claim here. For our purposes, it seems a
much less controversial statement that subjective intent is not entirely relevant or useful for the
analysis of the social meaning of religious displays. See generally STANLEY FISH, With the Compli
ments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 37 ( J 989).
1 34. This is essentially the Gricean definition of "meaning." GRICE, Utterer 's Meaning, supra
note 80; Paul Grice, Meaning, supra note 80, at 377-88.
1 35. CULLER, supra note 1 23, at 1 23. Culler is summarizing Derrida. Cf Amy Adler, What 's
Left: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1499,
1 541-44 (1996) (applying Culler's and Derrida's insights to postmodern political art).
1 36.

CULLER, supra note 1 23, at 1 23-24.

1 37.

1 23 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997).

1 38.

See Elewski, 1 23 F.3d at 54.

1 39. Id. at 59 (Cabranes, J., dissenting). At least one commentator agreed with Judge
Cabranes, finding the court's decision to "consider[] decorations hundreds of feet away from the
creche as part of the relevant context" to be out of line with Supreme Court and Second Circuit
precedent. Recent Cases, 1 1 1 HAR V. L. REV. 2462, 2466 ( 1 998). This objection certainly seems
sensible. However, it raises an obvious question: if "hundreds of feet away" is too far for a decora
tion to be considered part of the same display, how close must the decoration be? This is the kind of
question that inevitably arises whenever one attempts to delimit the relevant context.
140.

CULLER, supra note 1 23, at 1 24.
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For example, one might attempt to formulate a rule that displaying the
11
words "Gloria in Excelsis Deo" 4 on government property, with or without
any countervailing secular symbols, is per se an endorsement of religion and
therefore unconstitutional. But certainly if those words were displayed in a
religious painting in a government-sponsored display of medieval art or in a
poster intended to inform the citizenry about what kinds of religious dis
plays are unacceptable on city property, one could not seriously argue that
the city had endorsed religion. 1 42
These insights lead to the conclusion that a legal rule dependent on con
text will inevitably result in a highly fact-specific, subjective process of
143
adjudication. They also explain why this is so. Moreover, this feature of
the endorsement test-its dependence on contextual analysis-is arguably a
limitation inherent in any attempt to formalize an inquiry into social mean144
mg.
The indeterminacy of context with respect to religious symbols is aggra
vated, however, by the impossibility of using the potentially stabilizing
element of subjective intent to fix meaning. If to "mean" something is sim
ply to intend that one's utterance cause the audience to recognize what one
intends to say, 145 it stands to reason that if governmental "intent" were dis
cernible in any meaningful way-as it is in cases where there is an
accessible legislative history or at least statutory language that is easier to
"read" than a symbolic display-the "meaning" of the display would simi
larly be more easily discernible and less dependent on contextual clues. But,
as discussed above, it often is not possible to discern the government's in
tent.
Despite this irreducible indeterminacy, meaning is unavoidably context
dependent. If we are to determine the meaning or message conveyed by a
•

141.
This Latin phrase, which means "Glory to God in the highest," comes from Luke 2: 1 31 4 and was exhibited on the (constitutionally impermissible) creche in Allegheny. County of Alle
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580 & n.5 ( 1 989) (plurality opinion).
142. Larry Alexander makes a similar point in explaining the difficulty of distinguishing
"high-value speech" from "low-value speech" for First Amendment purposes:
[T]here is no principled way to demarcate what is to count as a unit or item of speech for pur
poses of assessing whether the speech is high or low value. Consider ( I ) a photograph of two
people fornicating (2) found within a medical textbook (3) being viewed by voyeurs (4) who
are being studied by psychologists.
Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker 's Intent, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 2 1 , 21 n.2 ( 1995). With
each iteration specified by Professor Alexander, one context is grafted onto another, eluding the
prior attempt to fix the context.
143.
Elewski, 1 23 F.3d at 57 (Cabranes, J., dissenting); cf Allegheny 492 U.S. at 674-76
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the endorsement test results in a "jurisprudence of minu
tiae").
1 44. The principles elucidated here hold true for conduct as much as for speech. If anything,
the meaning and context of expressive conduct are probably less determinate than linguistic mean
ing and context. Cf ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 561--62 ( 1 974) (discussing indeterminacy and contextual "framing" in everyday ex
perience and activity).
145.

See supra text accompanying note 79.
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display of religious symbols, then we have no choice but to look to the con
46
text for the answer.1
C. Context and Consensus
One aspect of context, in particular, deserves attention. The concept of
context extends beyond the particular physical or historical situation in
which the speech act is uttered; it also includes the "social" context. The
social context may be defined, in Lawrence Lessig's terms, as the "collec
tion of understandings or expectations shared by some group at a particular
7
time and place."14 Similarly, Stanley Fish has discussed "the shared assump
tions which enable [observers] to make the same kind of sense" of what they
see or hear.148 Thus, a speech act also takes on meaning, in part, by virtue of
a sort of consensus of those who observe it. Moreover, this consensus is a
part of the "conventional context" of the display-meaning the context of
linguistic conventions that create the conditions for the successful perform
49
ance of a speech act. 1 Thus, although meaning is, at least in part, an act of
discerning intent, it is also a conventional form of behavior; "[m]eaning is
more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of con
vention."150
This concept of social context has already arisen in the foregoing dis
1
cussion of the endorsement test and of social meaning.15 The "social
meaning" of segregation-that blacks were considered to be inferior to
whites-was possible only within the particular social context, in which
1
"[e]very one kn[ew]" 52 what segregation was supposed to signify. Indeed,
Justice O' Connor's heuristic of the reasonable observer may incorporate this
concept of consensus to some extent: the "reasonable observer" seems, in
part, intended to look to the views of the broader society and exclude the
views of hypersensitive "eggshell plaintiffs."153
146. But see FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 256-65 (arguing that power, and hence a message of
domination or subordination, may inhere in the symbolic discourse itself); Ravitch, supra note 1 14
(arguing that religious symbols themselves have certain qualities that make them more or less
"purely" religious, and therefore more or less likely to convey a religious message).
147. Lessig, supra note 94, at 958. Lessig suggests that social meaning must be uncontested
to be effective; thus, social meaning in Lessig's view appears to be highly consensus-driven.
148.

FISH, supra note 1 33, at 52.

Cf Lawrence, supra note 100, at 356 (explaining that the symbolic message conveyed by
government conduct can be determined "by considering evidence regarding the historical and social
context in which" the official action occurred in order to determine whether "a significant portion of
the population thinks of the governmental action" in a particular way (emphasis added)).
149.

1 50.

SEARLE, supra note 80, at 12-13, 45.

151.

See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.

152.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.S. 537, 557 (1 896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

1 53. Cf John Hart Ely, If at First You Don 't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group
Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 2 1 5 , 221-23
( 1 998) (concluding that the stigmatic harm alleged by segregation and anti-miscegenation laws is
not one requiring empirical proof, except perhaps to rule out the possibility of hypersensitive plain
tiffs, and arguing that the citation of social science evidence in Brown v. Board of Education

518

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:491

The notion that societal consensus plays a role in the interpretation of
speech acts poses particular problems in religious symbol cases. There is
much reason to doubt that a high degree of consensus is to be found regard
ing the meaning of a particular display, that is, regarding whether or not that
display constitutes endorsement of religion. The religious pluralism of our
society, combined with the easily observable range of disagreement about
the proper role of religion in civil society, likely means that observers do not
bring with them many "shared assumptions . . . [enabling them] to make the
154
same kind of sense" of a given display of religious symbols. Thus, Stanley
Fish states that "the occurrence of successful performatives is not assured,
because those who hear with different assumptions will be making a differ
155
ent kind of sense."
The lesser the degree of societal consensus, the less
likely it is that religious displays will be understood in the same way by all
observers.
The diversity of religious beliefs and of attitudes toward the role of re
ligion in society is thus another factor that, together with the reduced role of
156
subjective intent,
makes the religious symbol cases unique in the level of
interpretive difficulties they pose. In this way, cases involving the interpreta
tion of religious symbol displays are starkly unlike cases revolving around
interpretation of the tax code, for example: although hermeneutic quibbles
certainly arise in cases involving interpretation of the tax code, there is a
large degree of consensus about the meaning of commonly used terms
among those interpreting the code. The interpretive disagreements that do
arise, while occasionally leading to litigation, do not render tax jurispru
dence as unstable and unpredictable as the jurisprudence of religious
symbolism.
But even if such consensus could be found to exist in religious symbol
cases, how, exactly, is this consensus to be discovered? Jacques Derrida has
described the social consensus that gives meaning to utterances as "implicit
157
but structurally vague."
Is the "consensus meaning" of an utterance to be
discovered by surveying individuals and adding up the responses, with the

primarily served to exclude the possibility that the plaintiffs were hypersensitive); Feigenson, supra
note 90, at 98 (asserting that "establishment clause doctrine need not recognize 'totally irrational'
perceptions"). But cf Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 767 ( 1 995)
(plurality opinion) (criticizing the endorsement test because it would require governmental entities
trying to avoid an Establishment Clause violation "to guess whether some undetermined critical
mass of the community might . . . perceive the [governmental entity) to be advocating a religious
viewpoint").
1 54. FISH, supra note 1 33, at 52. Steven Smith has masterfully demonstrated not only that
there is currently no consensus regarding the meaning of the "principle" of "religious liberty," but
also that such consensus has historically never existed. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE
1 1 , 1 9-22 ( 1 995). He ultimately concludes from this fact that the project of formulating a theory of
the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is doomed to failure. Id. at 1 1 9.
1 55.

FISH, supra note 133, at 52.

1 56.

See supra text accompanying notes 64-78.

1 57.
JACQUES DERRIDA, Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC I, 2 (Samuel Weber &
Jeffrey Mehlman trans., Gerald Graff ed., 1 988).
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correct meaning being the one garnering the greatest number of votes? 158
The answer is almost certainly no. Attempting to view social meaning as a
purely empirical matter would inevitably raise the questions of how many
people must agree on the meaning of a display and of how those individual
views can be meaningfully compared and aggregated. Moreover, intuition
tells us that a display cannot come to "mean" something just because a cer
tain number of people say it does. Such "private" meanings, no matter how
many people share them, cannot make the display a religious one. If a tiny
cult suddenly begins worshipping an abstract sculpture in the town square,
for example, it seems unlikely that this worship would be sufficient to ren
der the s�mbol a "religious" one, vulnerable to Establishment Clause
challenge. 59 Thus, while it is true that social meaning is interpreted with
reference to societal consensus, it is undeniable that there is also a certain
structure, a set of rules, involved in determining meaning that exists beyond
this consensus and constrains the number of possible meanings it can pro
duce. 160
As John Searle has explained, language is a "rule-governed form of be
havior." 161 According to Searle, discerning the meaning of an utterance does
not involve an empirical judgment but rather a judgment based on knowl
edge of those rules:
It is possible . . . that other people in w hat I suppose to be my dialect group
have internalized different rules and consequently my linguistic characteri
zations would not match theirs. But it is not possible that my linguistic
characterizations of my own speech [i.e., such as saying, as a definitional
matter, that "women are female"] are false statistical generalizations from
insufficient empirical data, for they are not statistical, nor other kinds of
empirical generalizations, at all. That my idiolect matches a given dialect
group is indeed an empirical hypothesis . . . but the truth that in my idiolect
"oculist" means eye doctor is not refuted by evidence concerning the be
havior of others . .

.

.

162

In the context of the endorsement test, Justice O' Connor's emphasis on
the "judicial interpretation of social facts," as well as her insistence that the
1 58.
See Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 8, at 736-60 (proposing that the endorsement
effect of religious displays be measured like the consumer confusion element in trademark cases,
using statistical survey data).
1 59.
If continued for many years, however, this practice likely would tum the sculpture into a
religious symbol. At some point, the symbol would probably become widely recognized as a par
ticular group's object of worship, and eventually a critical mass of people would agree that the
symbol qualifies as religious.
160.
Cf Frank S. Ravitch, Struggling with Text and Context: A Hermeneutic Approach to
Interpreting and Realizing Law School Missions, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 73 1 , 734-38 (2000) (dis
cussing the notion that although individuals bring personal and societal predispositions to reading a
text, which influence their interpretation of the text, ''the horizon of the text will limit the range of
pre-understandings the interpreter can consistently project" (citing HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD 265-307, 369-75 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed., Cross
road Publ'g Corp. 1 989) (1 960))).
161.

SEARLE, supra note 80, at 12.

1 62.

Id. at 1 3.
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perceptions of individual observers (some of whom, perhaps, may be out
liers) are not particularly relevant, indicate that she, too, is acknowledging
that the consensus the Court seeks is not necessarily discoverable through
empirical research. 163 Justice Scalia's statement that only the views of the
"the community" and not of "individual members of the community" are
relevant in religious symbol cases likewise draws on this intuition. 164
Finally, as some language theorists have pointed out, expression and lin
guistic convention are inextricably bound up with power and authority. 16S
Pierre B ourdieu describes speech acts as "acts of authority, or, what
166
amounts to the same thing, authorized acts." What he means by this is that
speech acts must be societally "authorized," that is, they must fulfill certain
societally-mandated conditions in order to be successful. For the words "I
now pronounce you man and wife" to effectuate a marriage, for example,
they must be spoken by a person with the proper legal or religious authority
and under various other institutional conditions. These conditions-the con
ditions under which a speech act is recognized as what it intends to be-are
7
the conditions of "legitimate usage." 1 6 The speech act must be uttered by a
legitimate person, before legitimate receivers, according to legitimate
forms. 168 The conditions of legitimacy are dictated partly by law, partly by
informal norms, and partly by language itself. Some of these are more obvi
ously political than others-ranging, for example, from the requirement (in
most states) that the two individuals who are to be married be of different
sexes to the requirement that a specified number of witnesses be present.
These external controls exercise a coercive power over us; they control
meaning to a greater extent than any intent on our part can, and we are not
free to disregard them.1 69
Therefore, even if the "consensus meaning" of a display can be discov
ered, empirically or otherwise, it is not entirely clear that it should be the
1 63.
added).

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 ( 1 984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis

1 64.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 765 ( 1 995) (plurality
opinion). Nonetheless, in considering the constitutionality of religious displays, the Justices have
occasionally taken the divisiveness caused by the display into account. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry,
1 25 S. Ct. 2854, 287 1 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 702--04 (Brennan, J., dis
senting). Perhaps this reference to divisiveness, demonstrated by actual conflict within a community,
indicates a concern with the empirical question of how individual members of the community actu
ally view the display.
1 65.
See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 107-16 (John B.
Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991); JUDITH
BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 47-49 (1997).
166.

BouRDIEU, supra note 1 65, at 1 1 1 .

167.

Id. at 1 1 1-13.

1 68.

Id. at 1 1 3.

169. This is not, however, to deny the possibility of transforming these conventions and creat
ing new social meanings. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 1 65, at 36-41 (discussing the possibility of
changing meaning through introducing speech into new contexts); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 Cot.UM. L. REv. 903, 929-30 ( 1 996) (arguing that "norm entrepreneurs" can
help create or remove a stigma, thereby changing the social meaning associated with a particular
behavior).
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constitutionally relevant meaning. This is because the social context that
produces meaning reflects the power structure of the larger society; this
means that, as many observers have pointed out, the meaning discerned
1 10
from those displays will contain a majoritarian bias.
Some have explained,
for example, that the Court has failed to recognize that there is no "neutral"
17 1
observer position from which to judge the endorsement effect.
Because
the observer's beliefs will most likely affect her perspective, "actions that
reasonably offend non-adherents may seem so natural and proper to adher
1 72
ents as to blur into the background noise of society."
This "background
noise of society" is the societal power structure referred to by Bourdieu,
which makes the religious symbols and practices of dominant groups seem
natural, and therefore dictates that the speech act of endorsement is only
successful when it appears to exceed what is considered a "normal" amount
of government approval of religion. This "normal" amount of approval is
likely to be greater with respect to majority, mainstream religions, whose
practice and culture are more closely tied to the history and culture of the
173
By refusing to take

United States, than with respect to minority religions.

into account the differences between majority and minority religions, the
Court's endorsement test analysis threatens simply to reproduce uncon
sciously the majority perspective and to reinforce majority religious
174
power.
This has struck some as particularly inappropriate in the Estab
lishment Clause context,

where the rights of religious minorities are
1 75

arguably of paramount concern.

170.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 8 1 IOWA L. REV. 833, 861-63 ( 1996) (book review); McConnell,
supra note 8, at 154.
171.

McConnell, supra note 8 , at 148.

1 72.

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-15, at 1293 (2d ed. 1 988).

See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 1 2 . The Court's approach to the reality o f political power
1 73 .
differentials between minority and majority religious groups is in line with its treatment of equality
issues generally. The Court's religion clauses jurisprudence is largely religion-blind, just as its equal
protection jurisprudence is largely color-blind. See, e.g. , Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5
U.S. 200 ( 1 995); City o f Richmond v . J.A. Croson Co., 4 8 8 U.S. 469 ( 1 989); Ira C. Lupu, The Lin
gering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230, 266 ( 1 993) (noting the Court's
increasing concern with formal equality in Establishment Clause adjudication). This is not, of
course, the only possible approach to equality. Cf Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 107, 1 36 ( 1 976) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should be
understood as "asymmetrical," that is, as aiming to protect certain disadvantaged groups rather than
to treat all individuals the same).
174.
Thus, Justice Scalia's statement in Capitol Square that, in considering whether govern
ment endorsement of private religious speech can occur in a public forum, the Court has been
concerned only with "what would be thought by 'the community' -not by outsiders or individual
members of the community [who may be uninformed about the openness of the Capitol Square
forum]," Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 765 (1995) (plurality
opinion) (emphasis added), seems to reinforce a majoritarian approach to determining the presence
or absence of religious endorsement. Feldman, supra note 170 (critiquing the Court's entire religion
jurisprudence on this ground).
1 7 5 . See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.
L. REv. l l l 3, 1 1 78-79 ( 1 988); see also Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679 (6th
Cir. 1 994). But see Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
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To summarize, the social context-in the form of societal consensus
plays an important role in interpretation. In the context of displays of reli
gious symbols, however, this role is problematic for two reasons. First, it is
doubtful that any such consensus can be found, given the diversity of reli
gious beliefs and attitudes toward religion in U.S. society. Second, the
notion of societal consensus appears to be a majoritarian one, drawing upon
and reflecting the power structure of society. As such, reliance upon societal
consensus will tend to warp the jurisprudence of religious symbolism to
ward the perspective of adherents to majority-that is, Christian-religions.
IV. CONTEXT

AND CONSENSUS IN THE C OURTS

As one might expect, based on this theoretical framework, the Supreme
Court's attempts to tum context into a manageable concept have largely
failed in the religious symbol cases. This Part delineates the Court's strug
gles with the concept of context in the religious symbol cases. The Justices
have tried to use three different definitions of context, each of which failed,
ultimately, to lend analytic clarity to the endorsement inquiry. First, in Alle
gheny, the dominant definition of context was the immediate physical
setting of the display. Second, in Lynch, the majority defined context as the
overall holiday context. Third, at various points in Lynch and Allegheny the
Justices also struggled to incorporate the concept of historical context. There
is one kind of context that the Court has been particularly reluctant to con
front, however-the social context.
A. The Supreme Court 's Struggles with Context
1 . Immediate Physical Setting

In A llegheny, the Court attempted to limit the relevant context to the
immediate physical setting of the display. In considering whether the creche
displayed on the interior steps of the county courthouse impermissibly en
dorsed religion, the Court refused to consider the creche in connection with
17
the menorah displayed a block and a half away. 6 The Court found that the
display's "floral frame" conveniently demarcated the borders of its context
and turned the creche into "its own display distinct from any other decora
77
tions or exhibitions in the building." 1

Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. R.Ev. 673 (2002) (questioning the validity of the premise that
religious minorities are the special concern of the Establishment Clause).
1 76. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-600 (1 989); cf id. at 597 (stating
that the Court's task is "to determine whether the display of the creche and the menorah, in their
respective 'particular physical settings,' has the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious be
liefs"); Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 1 23 F.3d 5 1 , 59 (2d Cir. 1 997) (Cabranes, J., dissenting)
(describing the Allegheny Court's limitation of its inquiry to the creche and its immediate surround
ings as "the only explicit Supreme Court teaching addressing how broadly we ought to delineate or
define the display under review").
1 77.

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598 n.48.
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Even this most innocuous and natural attempt to delimit the context be
comes unmanageable in its application, however. The Court concluded that
the floral frame, while delineating the borders of the display, compounded
the endorsement effect because it drew attention to what was inside the
frame, and because the frame itself was composed of poinsettias, which are
traditional Christmas flowers. 178 Thus, the Court's contemplation of the im
mediate physical context swept in the display's frame or border, as well. Yet
this fact seems to undermine the very notion of a neutral border that demar
cates the space where the display ends. If the frame, too, is part of the
display context, it seems that only the space immediately outside the frame
could be the real border of the display. But what is to keep the Court from
taking this "frame" into account as well? As in Elewski, discussed above, the
question becomes just how much space the immediate physical context
should be understood to comprise--or how, exactly, to determine what that
immediate physical context is. 179
2. Overall Holiday Context

In Lynch, both the majority and the dissent appeared to view the relevant
context as the overall holiday season-they only disagreed over whether this
context was itself religious or secular. The majority explained that the
creche should be considered "in the context of the Christmas season," be
cause "[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would
inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause." 180 As
long as the creche was deployed merely to "celebrate the Holiday" and "to
depict the origins of that Holiday," it served a legitimate secular purpose. 181
The majority did note that the Christmas holiday has religious aspects
indeed, it went so far as to acknowledge that "[e]ven the traditional, purely
secular displays extant at Christmas . . . inevitably recall the religious nature
of the Holiday." 182 The Court's logic nonetheless tacitly assumes that
Christmas is fundamentally a secular holiday, because it stated that celebrat
ing that holiday is a secular purpose.

1 78.

See id. at 599.

179. See supra text accompanying notes 1 37-143. The Court's notion of context also arguably
includes that which has been excluded from the display. Arguing that the menorah display was con
stitutional, Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion in Allegheny, suggested that the
menorah was acceptable because the city had no less religious alternatives: "It is difficult to imagine
a predominantly secular symbol of Chanukah that the city could place next to its Christmas tree. An
1 8-foot dreidel would look out of place and might be interpreted by some as mocking the celebra
tion of Chanukah." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 6 1 8 (plurality opinion). Thus, one could argue that the
(nonexistent) 1 8-foot dreidel, too, is part of the context for Justice Blackmun.
1 80. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 ( 1984); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 666
(Kennedy, J ., dissenting) ("[T]he relevant context is not the items in the display itself but the season
as a whole."). The majority in Lynch did not actually apply the endorsement test, but, as Justice
Blackmun pointed out in Allegheny, the majority's analysis was functionally very similar to the
endorsement test. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594-95 (plurality opinion).
181.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 68 1 .

1 82.

Id. at 685.
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Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out the incoherence of the majority's
assumption: "The vice of this dangerously superficial argument is that it
overlooks the fact that the Christmas holiday in our national culture contains
1
both secular and sectarian elements." 83 Justice Brennan at first noted, for
example, that the creche's "symbolic purpose and effect is to prompt the
observer to experience a sense of simple awe and wonder appropriate to the
contemplation of one of the central elements of Christian dogma-that God
sent His Son into the world to be a Messiah." 184 Justice Brennan looked to
the overall holiday context, as well, distinguishing the holiday creche dis
play from other uses of religious symbols-such as in a museum setting. "In
[a museum] setting," Justice Brennan argued, "we would have objective
guarantees that the creche could not" endorse any single religion. 185 "In the
absence of any other religious symbols or of any neutral disclaimer, the in
escapable effect of the creche will be to remind the average observer of the
religious roots of the celebration he is. witnessing . . . ." 186
This last statement suggests that Justice Brennan assumed that Christ
mas was primarily a religious holiday, just as the majority assumed it was
secular, and that the religious nature of this holiday dictated that a creche in
a holiday display would also necessarily be religious. Otherwise, why would
"the absence of any other religious symbols" and of a "neutral disclaimer"
necessarily convey a religious message? Thus, Justice Brennan's argument,
like the majority's, considers the relevant context to be the overall holiday
setting. The only difference between Justice Brennan's argument and the
majority's is that Justice Brennan assumed that Christmas was primarily a
religious holiday, whereas the majority assumed it was primarily secular. It
is unclear, moreover, how the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent might be resolved without making an appeal to some other kind of
context, such as history or contemporary societal understandings. Yet, as
discussed below, these forms of context are not susceptible to formalization,
either.
3 . Historical Context

The problem of how to treat historical context gave the Justices consid
erable difficulties in Lynch and Allegheny. Although historical context has
often been considered to be particularly relevant to the Establishment Clause
inquiry, 187 it also seems to present particular problems for discerning the

1 83 .

Id. a t 709 (Brennan, J . , dissenting).

1 84.

Id. at 7 1 1 .

1 85 .

Id. at 7 1 3.

1 86.

Id.

1 87.
See, e.g. , JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 2 ( 1995) (noting that "(n]o provision of the Constitu
tion is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the religious clause of the
First Amendment" (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 , 33 ( 1 947) (Rutledge, J., dissent
ing)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
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88
meaning of religious symbols. 1 One problem posed by the notion of his
torical context is that the Justices do not agree about which history is
relevant. For Establishment Clause purposes, is it the history of "official
acknowledgment" of religion, 189 the history of the particular holiday cele
brated, the history of the symbol itself, or the history of the particular forum
where the display is located that is relevant? The Justices have appealed to
each of these histories at various points in evaluating the constitutionality of
religious displays. 190 Additionally, if all of these histories are relevant, how is
one to decide which one is dominant, in a case where they conflict? This
problem is an instance of the boundlessness of context-the ever-present
possibility of further specifying context.
The Justices are thus capable of arriving at different conclusions about
the permissibility of particular displays by choosing a broader or narrower
historical context. 191 For example, by surveying the history of official refer
ences to religion, Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Lynch,
concluded that a somewhat relaxed view of the permissibility of government
expressions of religious sentiment is most consonant with the intent of the
1
Framers of the Establishment Clause. 92 In dissent, Justice Brennan focused
specifically on the history of the public celebration of the Christmas holiday,
concluding for his part that this holiday engendered intense sectarian divi
siveness until quite recently and therefore should not be considered an
93
uncontroversial secular event. 1
The role of history in interpreting the social meaning of holiday symbols
is complex, of course, because the passage of time has the capacity both to
negate and simply to mask the religious significance of those symbols. On
the one hand, meaning is historically contingent: for example, although
Santa Claus may have once had religious significance as a representation of
Saint Nicholas, this figure is now usually considered by the Court to have
lost its religious connotations and to have become part of the "secular"
1 88.
For an excellent summary of the difficulties raised by the use of history, and particularly
of original intent, in the interpretation of the religion clauses, see id. at 1-6.
1 89.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674.

See id. at 674-78 (history of official recognition of religion); id. at 7 1 8-25 (Brennan, J .,
190.
dissenting) (history of the celebration of Christmas); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 7 8 1 -82 ( 1 995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg
ment) (history of the forum); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580-85 ( 1 989) (plurality
opinion) (history of the creche and the menorah as holiday symbols).
191.
Cf GOFFMAN, supra note 144, at 8 ("Any event can be described in terms of a focus that
includes a wide swath or a narrow one and-as a related but not identical matter-in terms of a
focus that is close-up or distant."); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 5 9 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ) (describing how using a broader or narrower concep
tion of context can change the results in criminal Jaw). An analogous point is made in Daryl
Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 1 3 1 1 , 1 332-75 (2002) (argu
ing that constitutional doctrine is plagued by the difficulty of determining how broadly or narrowly
the relevant transaction between the individual and the government is framed).
1 92.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-78; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 1 25 S. Ct. 2854, 2 861-63
(2005) (plurality opinion) (examining the history of official acknowledgements of religion in finding
a Ten Commandments display on government property to be constitutional).
1 93.

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 7 1 8-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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symbolism of the Christmas holiday. 194 The phenomenon whereby religious
symbols or traditions are seen to lose their religious force over time is famil
iar in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, forming the basis for the Court's
decisions to uphold the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws, for examp1e. 195
At the same time, however, it is possible that the passage of time simply
masks an endorsement of religion that was successful enough to become
uncontroversial in the end, by repressing or ignoring all dissent. This possi
bility seems to be implied by Justice Brennan's description of the sustained
controversy over the celebration of Christmas among Christian sects in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in America. 196 Justice Brennan pointed
out that "historical acceptance of a particular practice alone is never suffi
cient to justify a challenged governmental action, since, as the Court has
rightly observed, 'no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of
197
the Constitution by long use."' Similarly, it is possible that a government
act that once would have been inoffensive may now have the capacity to
offend certain individuals-due to increased religious diversity, for example,
or a change in citizens' sensibilities about the official acknowledgment of
1. .
8
re ig1on. 19

194.
See, e.g., id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Even Justice Brennan, in his dissent to
Lynch, takes for granted that Santa Claus is secular. See id. at 695 n. l (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 6 1 7 (plurality opinion) (describing the Christmas tree as the "preeminent
secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season"). The Christmas tree, treated in Allegheny as secu
lar, is arguably a symbol that is charged with religious meaning. Although pagan in origin, the
evergreen tree now symbolizes for Christians the everlasting life promised by Jesus and guaranteed
by his death and resurrection.
1 95.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 43 1 -53 ( 1 96 1); cf Michael C. Dorf, Recipe
for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory, 85 GEO. L.J. 1 857
( 1 997); Lawrence Lessig, Erie Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory,
-

1 10 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997).
1 96.

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 7 1 8-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

197.
Id. at 7 1 8 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 ( 1970)). One might take
issue with the accuracy of Justice Brennan's statement. The Supreme Court has on occasion de
clared, for example, that it will not reconsider longstanding precedent on a legal issue simply
because evidence arises that that precedent may have been wrong. See, e.g., Jefferson County
Pharrn. Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150, 154 n.6 (1983) ("Respondents argue that application of
the Act . . . would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth Amendment . . . . It is too late
in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when
they are engaged in proprietary activities."); cf U.S. v. Lopez, 5 14 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 ( 1 995) (Tho
mas, J., concurring) ("Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I
recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination
of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we
cannot wipe the slate clean."). Indeed, the Court seemed to accept the notion that longstanding prac
tice justified legislative prayers, which would otherwise violate the Establishment Clause. Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983). And in Van Orden v. Perry, the plurality suggested that the
fact that a Ten Commandments display had been in place without any complaints for forty years
weighed in favor of its constitutionality. 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858, 2864 (2005) (plurality opinion).
1 98.
See TRIBE, supra note 172, at 1 296 (2d ed. 1988); cf JUDITH BUTLER, supra note 165, at
1 3-14 (arguing that historical "context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance" of hate
speech, but also that offensive speech has a "changeable power" that allows it to gain different, even
opposite meanings when it is used in contexts for which it was not intended); FELDMAN, supra note
12, at 269-70.

December 2005]

Putting Religious Symbolism in Context

527

B. The Courts ' Struggles with Social Context and Consensus
Lower courts have struggled with social context when facing Establish
ment Clause challenges to symbols or displays that are not widely
understood as having religious content. Although it would presumably al
ways be possible to find someone, somewhere, who would not understand a
menorah as being a symbol connected with Judaism or who would see a
crucifix as merely a somewhat morbid sculpture, such symbols do not them
selves generally pose interpretive difficulties, because there is a broad
199
societal consensus that they are strongly associated with religion. In cases
dealing with more conventional religious symbols, the interpretive battle is
usually waged over whether the overall context conveys a message of ap
proval of Judaism or Christianity, rather than whether the symbol itself is
200
religious. In cases where the religious nature of the symbol itself is doubt
ful, however, courts have generally acknowledged the role that societal
consensus plays in creating meaning. Courts are forced to recognize that,
although it is indeed possible that some individuals might view the disputed
symbols as having religious significance, those views must be excluded be
cause they are simply shared by too few people.
201
In the Ninth Circuit case Alvarado v. City of San Jose, the plaintiffs
challenged San Jose's installation and maintenance of a sculpture intended
0
to celebrate the influence of Mexican and Spanish culture in the city. 2 2 The
sculpture was a representation of the "Plumed Serpent," a symbol of the Az
tec deity Quetzalcoatl, who was worshipped in Aztec and Mayan cultures
from about 1 00-300 A.D. until the sixteenth century. 203 After rejecting the
notion that the Plumed Serpent sculpture could raise Establishment Clause
concerns merely because it was once worshipped by a religious sect, the
Alvarado court focused on the contemporary social context in order to inter
pret the symbol. B y way of demonstrating the symbol's current religious
significance, the plaintiffs had pointed to New Age and Mormon texts dis
cussing Quetzalcoatl in spiritual terms, as well as to the statements of a
councilwoman who found the sculpture to have spiritual significance for her.
The court considered those writings and statements but noted that each one
asserted a purely subjective view of Quetzalcoatl as having religious signifi
cance or expressed a purely subjective belief that Quetzalcoatl was relevant

199. But see Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 770--72 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the unadorned Latin cross erected on public property was more
a political symbol than a religious one).
200. See, e.g. , County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598 (1989) ("There is no doubt,
of course, that the creche itself is capable of communicating a religious message.").
201 .

94 F.3d 1 223 (9th Cir. 1 996).

202.

See Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1 225.

203.

See id. at 1226.
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04
to an established religion.2 With respect to the New Age writings, the court
stated, for example:
They refer specifically to Quetzalcoatl and the Plumed Serpent, from
which they derive spiritual sustenance, but it is clear that the experience
they describe is subjective, however much they may wish to share it. They
refer to Quetzalcoatl in the past tense and describe him as a deity belong
ing to an ancient tradition. Even the bits quoted in the plaintiffs' brief are
full of language signifying a subjective response: "the prophetic facts of

gave me the conviction that Quetzalcoatl was not just a local af
I saw in Quetzalcoatl an invisible and immanent force
underlying and transcending the mythic fabric of mechanization . . . It oc
curred to me that [Quetzalcoatl] . . . was himself an incarnation of

the matter

fair. Rather,

.

Christ."

205

The court then rejected as "unworkable" the plaintiffs' definition of a reli
gious symbol, for Establishment Clause purposes, as "any symbol . . . to
which an individual ascribes 'serious or almost-serious' spiritual signifi
06
cance."2
The Ninth Circuit's approach echoes that of the Sixth Circuit in Kunsel
07
man v. Western Reserve Local School District, 2
dealing with an
Establishment Clause challenge to use of the "Blue Devil" as a school mas
cot. The court found the plaintiffs' sense of personal offense at the symbol
to be insufficient to show that the school was endorsing Satanism by adopt
ing the symbol, holding that no reasonable observer would share the
plaintiffs' perspective. 208 The court noted that the defendant had submitted
affidavits from the senior class president and various school officials, stating
that the mascot had not been perceived as a religious symbol, but rather as a
"menacing type of figure for athletic activities."209 Quoting the district court,
the Sixth Circuit thus held that "the fact that plaintiffs are personally of
fended by the mascot is insufficient to establish a First Amendment
w
violation in the context of the facts of this case."2
In both A lvarado and Kunselman, then, the court looked beyond the
plaintiffs for evidence of a broader societal consensus as to the meaning of
the contested symbol. Those cases, in which the courts decided that certain
symbols were incapable of supporting an endorsement of religion because

204. See id. at 1 229-3 1 . The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that New Age was a
religion for the purposes of the Establishment Clause.
205.

Id. at 1230.

206.

Id. (emphasis added).

207.

70 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 1995).

208.

See Kunselman, 70 F.3d at 932-33.

209.

Id. at 932.

2 1 0. Id. at 932-33; see also Guyer v. Sch. Bd., 634 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 994)
(stating, in the context of an Establishment Clause challenge to the use of Halloween symbols in the
public schools, that "[t]he determinative question is not whether the witch, cauldron, and broom are
capable of communicating a religious message to some people. What is determinative is the context
in which these symbols are displayed." (citation omitted)).
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they simply could not reasonably be understood within the current social
context as religious in nature, demonstrate the important role of social con
text in determining meaning. The courts' methodology, which seems to have
yielded eminently reasonable results, nonetheless highlights the difficulties
posed by social context and consensus.
In each case, the court looked to evidentiary submissions to determine
the societal consensus about the meaning of the challenged symbols. The
meaning of the allegedly religious symbols thus appears to be conceptual
ized by the lower courts as primarily an empirical question. The courts
attempt to determine the generally understood meaning of a symbol by
looking to the affidavits of individual members of the community and reject
the plaintiffs' interpretations largely because they are shared by too few
211
people.
This approach could prove problematic in a less straightforward
case, however, for a number of reasons.
First, meaning-which is certainly dependent on consensus to some ex
tent-is nonetheless not an empirical concept. Moreover, the obvious
difficulties with treating meaning as an empirical matter are likely to be
magnified in the judicial setting, where courts will be faced with the prob
lem of how to weigh evidentiary submissions-both expert and nonexpert
regarding the meaning of symbols. A second, equally important problem
with searching for societal consensus through evidentiary submissions is
that such consensus will often be impossible to find, and to the extent it is
"found," it will simply be a reflection of the majority viewpoint.
Unlike the lower courts in Alvardo and Kunselman, the Supreme Court
seems intent on excluding the social context from its analysis in religious
display cases. For example, the Court is particularly loath to consider the
currently existing relationships of social and political power among reli
gious groups and to treat minority religions differently from majority
religions for endorsement test purposes. In Allegheny, the only Supreme
Court case to consider the constitutionality of a minority religious display (a
menorah), the Court's opinion did not discuss the fact that the religion at
issue was a minority religion. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the opinion of
the Court, did note the relatively small Jewish population of Pittsburgh, in a
212
In

footnote in a part of his opinion that was joined by no other Justice.

remarking on this minority status, Justice B lackmun stated that it was "dis
tinctly implausible to view the combined display of the tree, the sign, and
213
Justice B lackmun was

the menorah as endorsing the Jewish faith alone."

2 1 1 . The Supreme Court has never considered an Establishment Clause challenge to a display
involving a less manifestly religious symbol, such as those involved in Alvarado and Kunselman;
therefore, it has not directly addressed the role of actual individuals' perceptions in deciding whether
a symbol is religious. Cf Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 767
( 1 995) (plurality opinion) (criticizing the endorsement test because it would require governmental
entities trying to avoid an Establishment Clause violation "to guess whether some undetermined
critical mass of the community might . . . perceive the [governmental entity] to be advocating a
religious viewpoint").
2 1 2.

See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 6 1 6 n.64 ( 1 989).

2 1 3.

Id.
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quick to qualify this remark, however, adding that he did not mean to imply
"that it is implausible, as a general matter, for a city like Pittsburgh to en
dorse a minority faith. The display of a menorah alone might well have that
effect."21 4 Thus, even Justice Blackmun remained insistent that minority or
majority religious status is irrelevant to endorsement test analysis.
Of course, if the Court were to take the social context into account, it
might very well conclude that the minority status of the menorah is, in fact,
relevant to whether its display by the county conveys a message of religious
endorsement. After all, it does seem less plausible that a city where Jews
have relatively modest political and demographic representation would in
tend to endorse the Jewish religion by displaying a menorah-just as it was
21s
unlikely, in the Sixth Circuit case of Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, that the
city of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in which Buddhists are a negligible minority
of the population, intended to endorse Buddhism when it erected a "Bud
dhist bell" in a city park as a symbol of friendship with Japan, fifty years
after that city had played a seminal role in the Manhattan Project during
World War Il. 21 6 Excluding the broader social context from the interpretive
enterprise, including the minority or majority status of the particular religion
represented, renders the inquiry into the meaning of the display incomplete.
Indeed, it is somewhat like trying to determine the social meaning of racial
segregation without considering which racial group is in power. 217
Several commentators have taken the Court to task for its reluctance to
consider the social context, in that the Court has thus far refused to consider
the differing perspectives that members of religious majorities and minori
ties are likely to bring to their observation of a given display. Those
commentators have noted that the Court has generally declined to give
prominence to the perspective of the religious outsider, in particular, when
deciding whether the "reasonable observer" would perceive a government
practice or symbol to constitute an endorsement of religion. Yet, "[w]hether
a particular governmental action appears to endorse or disapprove religion
depends on the presuppositions of the observer, and there is no 'neutral' po
8
sition, outside the culture, from which to make this assessment."21 Thus,
despite the fact that the degree to which a governmental practice causes of
fense is likely to be affected by the religious beliefs of the observer of that

214.

Id.

215.

222 F.3d 2 5 9 (6th Cir. 2000).

2 1 6. Brooks, 222 F.3d at 262-63. The Sixth Circuit, following the Supreme Court's lead, did
not discuss the minority status of the Buddhist religion in Oak Ridge.
217.
Cf Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 2003
SuP. CT. REv. 357, 390-93 (criticizing the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence for its
refusal to take social and historical context into account). This is not to say that race and religion
pose identical problems for discerning social meaning. For example, social meaning is arguably
clearer in the race context, because the goal of racial equality is understood and accepted by most
people, even if there are disputes over how this equality principle is to be applied. In the religion
context, however, there seems to be a dispute over the substance of principle to be applied, as well
as over how to apply it. The indeterminacy is thus more profound.
2 1 8.

McConnell, supra note 8, at 148.
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practice,21 9 the doctrine applied b y the Court seemingly assumes that all citi
zens-Christians, members of minority religions, and nonreligious
citizens-share the same perspective.220 As discussed above, however, just
the opposite is likely to be true. The existence of religious pluralism and a
diversity of viewpoints about the proper role of religion in society most
likely means that the various observers of a display-not to mention the
judges who are supposed to stand in the shoes of those observers and decide
what the display means to them-bring different assumptions to the table,
and therefore will arrive at different social meanings in interpreting the dis
play. 221
I do not mean to argue in this Article simply that a Jew and an Evangeli
cal Christian may both view the same creche display but receive different
messages from it-that the display may profoundly offend and alienate the
former observer, while barely registering with the latter, for instance. Such
an assertion, while intuitively appealing and perhaps even accurate in a great
number of cases, falls prey to a kind of essentialism that I hope to avoid in
this analysis, an essentialism that I believe other commentators have es
poused when discussing the endorsement test. 222 Rather, I mean to argue that
it is not simply one's religious beliefs or lack thereof, but also one's assump
tions and beliefs about the proper relationship between church and state that
aggravate the difficulty of discerning whether a given display conveys a
message of endorsement of religion. Of course, an individual's religious
identity, as well as other aspects of her experience and background, likely
influence these assumptions and beliefs. But a devout Christian who none
theless believes that religion is an entirely private matter, to be kept
completely separate from the realm of government, may find that a Christ
mastime creche display connotes an endorsement of religion (one that is
entirely inappropriate) ; or, on the contrary, that it conveys an offensive trivi
alization of religion. In any case, the individual's religious identity does not
necessarily determine the individual's understanding of the message con
veyed by the creche.
Indeed, recent innovative empirical research by Gregory Sisk, Michael
Heise, and Andrew Morriss on the influence of a judge's religion on his or

2 1 9. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 1 72, §§ 14-15, at 1 293 ("[A]ctions that reasonably offend
non-adherents may seem so natural and proper to adherents as to blur into the background noise of
society."); McConnell, supra note 8, at 154 (describing the endorsement test's bias in favor of main
stream religions).
220. Indeed, the Court's practice of granting standing in religious symbol cases to almost any
observer of the display, without regard to the religious beliefs of that observer, is perhaps further
evidence of this attitude. See Note, Expressive Harms and Standing, 1 1 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 3 1 3, 1 320
( 1 999).
22 1 .
An even more radical critique has been put forward by some scholars who argue that
neutrality is itself an illusory concept in such contested matters, because there is simply no baseline
with respect to which neutrality can be determined. See, e.g. , SMITH, supra note 1 54; Ravitch, supra
note 1 30.
222.
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 8, at 7 1 1 n.52 ("Indeed it is difficult to believe that the
Lynch majority would have reached the same result had there been a Jew on the Court to speak from
the heart about what public displays of creches really mean to Jews.").

532

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:49 1

her decisionmaking in First Amendment cases supports the intuition that an
individual's religion affects, but does not completely explain, an individual's
perspective on church-state problems.223 For example, Sisk, Heise, and Mor
riss found, after an extremely careful statistical study, that Jewish judges
were more likely than others to approve Establishment Clause claims.224 Al
though no correlation with religion (or lack thereof) could be found for
judges who tended toward strong church-state separation and weak free ex
ercise rights, "Jewish judges along with judges from non-mainstream
Christian backgrounds were significantly more likely to approve of judicial
intervention to overturn the decisions or actions of the political branch that
either refused to accommodate religious dissenters or provided an official
imprimatur upon a religious practice or symbol."225 Relatedly, the social con
text in which the judge operated-specifically, the percentage of Jewish
adherents compared to the community's entire population, as well as the
percentage of individuals in the judge's community who were adherents of
any religion, influenced-to a statistically significant degree-the judge's
attitude toward Establishment Clause and Free Exercise claims.226 Perhaps
somewhat counterintuitively, a high rate of religious adherence in a judge's
community was correlated with strong recognition of both Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause rights-a finding that the authors convincingly
explain by pointing out that:
[B]ecause a strong overall level of religious adherence in a community
emphatically is not the equivalent of uniformity of beliefs, such a commu
nity in fact may combine a high level of religious devotion with some
appreciation of religious diversity, which might move that community both
to be receptive to religious dissenters and to be skeptical of governmental
actions that appear to elevate one form of religious tradition above others.

221

Even more significantly, the authors found that the more religiously homo
geneous a judge's community was, the more likely that judge was to uphold
a claim that a governmental display of religious symbolism violated the Es
tablishment Clause. 228 Their work could thus be read to caution against
making entirely reductionist or essentialist assumptions about the exact role
played by an individual's religious identity in interpretation.
Nonetheless, several commentators have criticized the Court for declin
ing to adopt the perspective of the "reasonable nonadherent," rather than that
of the "reasonable observer."229 Laurence Tribe was perhaps the first to ob223.
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 Omo ST. L.J. 491 (2004).
224.

Id. at 502.

225.

Id.

226.

Id. at 589-90.

227.

Id. at 590.

228.

Id. at 59 1 .

229.

See, e g., TRIBE, supra note 1 72, § § 14-15, at 1 296.
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serve that "[w]hen deciding whether a state practice makes someone feel
like an outsider, the result often turns on whether one adopts the perspective
of an outsider or that of an insider."230 It is therefore the perspective of the
person who is a religious outsider with respect to the particular symbol at
issue that should be assumed by the Court, according to Tribe and others. 23 1
Even accepting this questionable premise, it seems that adoption of the
perspective of the "reasonable nonadherent," however, is still unlikely to
resolve the interpretive problems at the heart of the religious symbol cases.
Rather, urging courts to assume the perspective of the "reasonable nonad
herent" raises a host of additional questions: How are courts to assume this
perspective, especially if it is a foreign perspective for the individual judge?
Is the judge to attempt to do so by exercising the power of empathy? B_ri
giving more weight to the testimony of nonbelievers than to believersi 2
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that it is exclusively, or especially, the sen
sibilities of the nonadherent that are or should be at the heart of the Court's
concern in religious symbolism cases. 233
Given the multiple ways in which I have demonstrated context to be un
stable and unformalizable, the act of interpreting a display of religious
symbolism-whether from the perspective of the reasonable nonadherent or
from some other perspective-will continue to pose challenges. Although
focusing on the perspective of the religious outsider, assuming it is possible
for judges to do so, might narrow the range of possible assumptions with
which a court is to view religious displays, the outsider perspective does not
solve other problems of context. Physical and historical aspects of context,
as well as the "overall holiday context" remain elusive.
V. CAN THE PROBLEM OF CONTEXT B E S OLVED ?

The foregoing discussion suggests that it is simply impossible to formu
late a stable rule for determining whether and under what conditions a
symbolic display conveys a message of religious endorsement and is there
fore unconstitutional. For the central lesson of modem speech act theory is
that, although meaning is unavoidably context dependent, context itself is a
boundless concept that cannot be usefully codified or delimited. Rather, a
certain measure of indeterminacy is an inherent quality of all symbolic
230.

Id. at 1 293.

See, e.g., Anjali Sakaria, Note, Worshipping Substantive Equality over Formal Neutral
ity: Applying the Endorsement Test to Sect-Specific Legislative Accommodations, 37 HARV. C.R.
23 1 .

C.L. L. REv. 483, 494 (2002).
232.
Indeed, such a rule might be unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. But cf
Feigenson, supra note 90, at 99 (arguing that courts deciding cases under the endorsement test
should consider the testimony of witnesses of different backgrounds).
233.
See Marshall, supra note 89, at 374 (arguing that "the harm of establishment is not tied
to its effects upon outsiders," and that "[i]t is the government's message that is critical, not the ef
fects of that message . . . . Non-Christians, therefore, have no greater or lesser claim than do
Christians that the state has improperly endorsed Christianity by displaying a cross, creche or other
such symbol"); cf Note, supra note 220, at 1 320 (discussing the broad standing accorded by the
Supreme Court, to adherents and nonadherents alike, to challenge religious displays).
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(linguistic or nonlinguistic) communication. Moreover, this indeterminacy is
aggravated in the religious symbol context for two reasons: first, the poten
tially stabilizing force of subjective intent is more or less removed from the
picture; and second, religious pluralism in the community interpreting those
religious symbols increases the likelihood of divergent viewpoints and un
derstandings of a given display. So long as the courts remain concerned with
the constitutionality of certain kinds of governmental messages-in other
words, as long as they are concerned with social meaning-the problem of
indeterminacy will not go away. Given this state of affairs, what, if anything,
can be done to improve the Court's religious symbolism jurisprudence?
A. Per Se Rules Permitting or Forbidding Religious Symbols
on Public Property

If, as I have argued here, a case-by-case, context-based determination of
the "message" conveyed by religious symbols leads ineluctably to jurispru
dential inconsistency, one might propose a clear per se rule-either
permitting any and all religious symbolism on public property, or forbidding
the same-as a straightforward solution to the indeterminacy of social
meaning. At least a per se rule would be easy to administer, and it would not
call on courts to grapple with the messy task of discerning social meaning
under conditions in which they are most likely doomed to failure. This con
siderable advantage makes per se rules worth considering in more depth but
ultimately does not support the adoption of such a rule either favoring or
disfavoring religious symbols.
1 . Per Se Rule Permitting Religious Symbols

·

A per se rule permitting any and all religious symbols on public property
would be equivalent to a determination that the Establishment Clause is
simply not implicated by such symbolic speech, or that controversies arising
from those symbols are nonjusticiable. And indeed, one might argue that the
interpretive difficulties inherent in religious symbol cases counsel against
courts' involvement in this area. Because it is so difficult to determine what
a religious display "means" and whether it conveys a message of endorse
ment, and because the interpretation of such displays, being inevitably
context dependent, does not lend itself to formulation into legal rules, the
argument goes, courts should simply get out of the business of interpreting
3
them. 2 4 Another defense of per se rules permitting religious symbols would
argue, as some have done, that real-world harms and effects, not social
meanings and expressive harms, are the traditional concern of our legal sys
tem. 235 Relatedly, some have cogently argued that the Establishment Clause

234. Steven Smith has advocated this position, Smith, supra note 8, at 33 1-32, but appears to
have moderated his view somewhat recently. SMITH, supra note 154, at 1 22-27.
Cf Note, supra note 220, at 1 3 1 3 - 1 8 (discussing the apparent tension between the notion
235.
of "expressive harm" and the Article III requirement of concrete and particularized injury). This
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is traditionally concerned with actual religious coercion, which is absent in
the case of mere symbolic encouragement. 2 36
Essentially, such arguments amount to an attack on the notion that sym
bolic or expressive concerns are relevant to the Establishment Clause
analysis. This Article assumes the position that such concerns are central at
least in the narrow class of cases involving Establishment Clause challenges
to religious symbolism, without articulating a full defense of that position.
Instead, this Article centers on the problem of how social meaning is to be
determined, once it is accepted that social meaning is relevant. Nonetheless,
some points may be made in defense of the expressivist approach.
First, one might point out that, even if symbolic harms are not cogniza
ble under other constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that symbolic entanglement of the government with religion is
one of the central evils that the Establishment Clause was intended to pro
tect against.237 The view that symbolic harm is not constitutionally
cognizable is thus simply not in line with longstanding precedent. The Court
explained in Engel v. Vitale, 238 for example, that "[t]he Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of di
rect governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to
9
coerce nonobserving individuals or not."23 The Court continued by ac
knowledging that even purely symbolic entanglement of government with
religion may exert an indirect coercive force on individuals, but also ex
plained that "the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much
further than that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to
degrade religion.''240 Indeed, the Court in Engel noted that the state
composed English Book of Common Prayer, which embodied the symbolic
unity of church and state, represented an important reason for the colonists'
decision "to leave England and its established church and seek freedom in
America from England's governmentally ordained and supported relig
ion."241 Whatever the merits of the view that the Establishment Clause was
argument also engages a larger debate, beyond the scope of this paper, regarding whether the ex
pressive theories of law have any merit as a general matter. Compare Adler, supra note 13, with
Anderson & Pildes, Expressive Theories, supra note 1 3.
236. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865-66 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 ( 1 989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 4 1
U. PITT. L . REV. 673 ( 1 980); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 4 1 3- 1 7 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of
Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv.933 ( 1 986).
237.
Stephen Gey has attacked the coercion theory on the ground that it is inconsistent with
the "main thrust" of the Establishment Clause. Gey, supra note 86, at 465.
238.

370 U.S. 42 1 (1962).

239.

Engel, 310 U.S. at 430.

240.

Id. at 43 1 .

24 1 . Id. at 425-27. Of course, the Court's pronouncements on history and original intent in
Engel and other Establishment Clause cases, most notably Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
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originally intended to protect against symbolic harm, it is now well estab
lished that the Court takes such harms into account in Establishment Clause
cases, and several commentators seem to agree that "government-sponsored
religious messages are more problematic than government funding of relig
ion and, more broadly, that expressive harms are the chief harms with which
the Establishment Clause should be concerned."242 Indeed, even Justice Ken
nedy, who has espoused an approach to the Establishment Clause under
which only coercive exercises of government power would be unconstitu
tional, has nonetheless admitted that the Establishment Clause would bar
some symbolic displays, such as "a large Latin cross [erected] on the roof of
city hall."243
The view that a per se rule rejecting out of hand all claims of Establish
ment Clause injury from religious symbols would be inconsonant with
Supreme Court precedent is further supported by the Supreme Court's
standing rules in Establishment Clause cases. Rather than expressing suspi
cion about the viability of such claims of symbolic injury, the Supreme
Court has relaxed its rules in Establishment Clause cases-perhaps out of
the recognition that otherwise such claims would be nonjusticiable, which
would be a clearly undesirable result in its view. 244 In cases involving reli
gious symbols, in particular, the Supreme Court has never set forth a theory
of standing but has seemingly granted standing to any plaintiff in proximity
to the offending symbol.245

l ( 1 947), have been deservedly attacked by a number of scholars. Nonetheless, those statements
form the foundation of current Establishment Clause doctrine.
242.
Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious
Libeny, 1 17 HARV. L. REv. 1810, 1 876 & n.256 (2004). Kathleen Sullivan has defended the notion
that the Establishment Clause reaches symbolic encouragement of religion and not just coercive
government actions on textualist grounds:
[T]he right to free exercise of religion implies the right to free exercise of non-religion. No one
may be coerced into worship, any more than out of it. . . . Thus the Free Exercise Clause would
forbid the state to coerce minority sects or atheists into contrary beliefs, even without the Es
tablishment Clause.
But the Establishment Clause cannot be mere surplusage. If the Free Exercise Clause
standing alone guarantees free exercise of non-religion, the Establishment Clause must do
more than bar coercion of non-believers . . . . If the Establishment Clause is to have independ
ent meaning, it must bar something other than coercion of private citizens into confessions of
official faith.
In the context of government speech and symbols, that "something else" is government
stamps of approval upon religion . . . . On this reading, the Establishment Clause does more
than bar "coercion"; it bars "endorsement" and "acknowledgement" of religion as well.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 205--06 ( 1 992).
243.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Moroever, as Noah Feldman has insightfully acknowledged, the concept
of coercion is not itself without some indeterminacy. Feldman,

supra note 236, at 416-17.

244.

See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-106 (1968).

245.

Note, supra note 220, at 1319-20; cf City of Edmond v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 120 1 , 1202

(1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (arguing that the Supreme Court has been
too lax with respect to standing in religious symbol cases).
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A final response would point out that symbolism is of central impor
tance to the functioning of religion. One might even go so far as to argue
that symbols are the primary mode through which religion exerts its persua
sive force.246 To give the government free rein in displaying religious
symbols would thus be to lend considerable support to religion. Moreover,
Ira Lupu has argued that symbolic government action has become more
prominent in Establishment Clause debates than even official financial sup
port of religion for a number of reasons, one of which is the growing
importance of symbols in our contemporary society of fast-paced mass
communication.247 He notes that:
Eye-catching pictures have always been worth many words, but the accu
racy of renderings and the speed of their transmission have improved many
times over between the Framers' time and our own .

. . . In a fast-moving political culture in which visual images dominate
public focus, public controversy over matters of government speech about
religion can be expected to take precedence over issues of government
248

money in support of religion.

Ultimately, however, to one who embraces the coercion theory of the Es
tablishment Clause, a per se rule permitting religious symbolism on public
property will most likely be an attractive alternative solution.249 This position
would be inconsistent with the expressivist view, which recognizes that
symbols on public property can convey messages to the observers and that
those messages can be constitutionally problematic. A full defense of the
expressivist approach, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.250
2. Per Se Rule Forbidding Religious Symbols

At the other extreme would be a per se rule that flatly prohibits the dis
play of any religious symbols on government property. Again, this rule
would seem to be clear and administrable, avoiding the indeterminacy prob
lems described above. In addition, one might argue that very little is actually
lost if the government cannot permit or sponsor the display of religious
symbols on public property. It might appear that there is much to be gained
and little to be lost by such an absolute prohibition.

246. See, e.g. , W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. B arnette, 3 1 9 U.S. 624, 632 ( 1 943) ("[T]he church
speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and clerical raiment . . . ."); THOMAS
FAWCETT, THE SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE OF RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY ( 1 970).
247.

Lupu, supra note 1 1 1 , at 787-88.

248.

Id.

249. But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-61 ( 1989) (Kennedy, J., con
curring in part and dissenting in part).
250. As noted above, other commentators have written such defenses. See, e.g., Cole, supra
note 84, at 583-86. Perhaps the fullest defense of the "symbolic" understanding of the Establish
ment Clause is contained in Marshall, supra note 87.
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Like the per se rule permitting religious displays, the per se rule forbid

ding all religious symbols may be vulnerable to attack, depending on one's

theory of the underlying substantive values that the Establishment Clause is

intended to serve. The per se rule against religious symbols would run con

trary to the accommodationist view, which would argue that religion, as a
vital part of citizens ' lives and perha s even of public life, deserves ac
g1
knowledgement in the public square. 5 Some commentators have argued

that something vital is lost if government is prevented from sponsoring reli
gious symbols even in certain anodyne contexts. 252

The usual rationale in favor of some symbolic accommodation of relig

ion is that it is necessary in order to avoid excessive hostility to religion. It

would be a false statement, proponents of this view argue, for government to
send the message that religion plays no legitimate role in public life, since it

obviously does play an important role for many citizens; thus, denying any

symbolic recognition to religion would be tipping the scale in favor of non

religion, which is also forbidden by the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. 253 Others have urged that symbols such as those celebrating recog
nized holidays and commemorating events from our shared history promote

cultural cohesiveness and thereby impart the "practical benefit to be derived
from community spirit and cultural continuity." 254
Moreover, as Capitol Square demonstrates, other First Amendment con

cerns-particularly free speech concerns-may be raised by the public

display of religious symbols. A per se rule prohibiting the display of reli
gious

symbols on public property, if it included privately sponsored

displays, could in many cases result in an affirmative disadvantage or bur

den imposed on religious speech by comparison to nonreligious speech.

Such a result would most likely run afoul of the entire line of free speech

55

public forum cases, from Widmar v. Vincent2 through Lamb 's Chapel v.
Center Mo riches Union Free School District, 256 Rosenberger v. Rector and

25 1 .
See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PuBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ( 1 984).
252.
See, e.g., Kelly C. Crabb, Religious Symbols, American Traditions and the Constitution,
1 984 BYU L. REV. 509, 5 10-14; see also ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243
F.3d 289, 307 (6th Cir. 200 1 ).
253.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 ( 1 984); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
3 1 5 ( 1 952); Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1 606, 1 64 1-42
( 1 987).
254.
Crabb, supra note 252 at 5 1 0-14; see also Capitol Square, 243 F.3d at 29 1 , 307 (uphold
ing the constitutionality of the Ohio state motto, "With God All Things Are Possible," in part
because "[l]ike the national motto, and the national anthem, and the pledge of allegiance, the Ohio
motto is a symbol of a common identity" and noting that "[s]uch symbols unquestionably serve an
important secular purpose-reenforcing the citizen's sense of membership in an identifiable state or
nation"). Justice Scalia has also referenced "the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious
believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as a people, and with respect to our
national endeavors." McCreary County v. ACLU, 1 25 S. Ct. 2722, 2756 (2005).
255.

454 U.S. 263 ( 1 98 1 ).

256.

508 U.S. 384 ( 1 993).
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57
Visitors of University of Virginia,2 and Good News Club v. Milford Central
58
2
School.
Finally, the proposal that the Court adopt a per se rule prohibiting all re

ligious symbols on public property is susceptible to a more fundamental

critique. Even a straightforward per se rule is subject to substantial ambigu

ity, due to the fact that any attempt to stabilize context-even through the

use of a per se rule-is vulnerable to the ever-present possibility of describ

ing a new context to which the per se rule cannot possibly be meant to
5
apply.2 9 This problem was described above as one aspect of the boundless
ness of context.

To put the point more concretely, the application of a per se rule forbid

ding

all

religious

symbols

on

public

property,

for example,

would

presumably require an injunction forbidding the government to sponsor an

exhibition of medieval art in the lobby of the city hall. Likewise, the display

of a Buddhist bell by the City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, as a symbol of
friendship and reconciliation with Japan fifty years after the City of Oak

Ridge had played a major role in developing the atom bomb in World War
0
II, would also be unconstitutional.26 It is difficult to imagine what Estab
61
lishment Clause values might be served by those results; 2 indeed, much

cultural benefit could be lost if such a sweeping prophylactic rule were
adopted.

B. A Presumption against Religious Symbols on Government Property
A more concrete solution to improve the jurisprudence in this area

again, with the caveat that the fundamental problem of indeterminacy is

endemic to any jurisprudence centered on social meaning-is to add a pre

sumption against religious symbols on government property to the current

endorsement test. This is the solution proposed by Justice Stevens in his
Allegheny opinion, but for different reasons from those I present here.262

Presumptions in law may serve a number of purposes, at least two of

which are relevant here. First, presumptions are our legal system's response

to uncertainty, ignorance, or indeterminacy. Since "[t]he defining trait of

257.

5 1 5 U.S. 8 1 9 (1995).

258.

533 U.S. 98 (2001).

259.

See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.

260.

Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000).

261.

But see Feigenson, supra note 90, at 109-10 (suggesting that the National Gallery's

display of works of religious art "raises major constitutional issues," which should, nonetheless, be
resolved in favor of permitting the display).

262. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 650 ( 1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2874, 2882 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Drawing on the history of the Establishment Clause, Justice Stevens determined that
such displays violate the Clause because of the unacceptable risk they pose for offending adherents
and nonadherents alike, as well as for fomenting divisiveness in the political body. See also Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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6
litigation is decision under uncertainty,"2 3 the law imposes presumptions

and burdens of proof to manage this uncertainty by designating which party
bears the risk of that uncertainty (and therefore loses if the presumption is

not overcome) .2 64 Often this uncertainty revolves around matters of historical

fact, which are inaccessible to the decisionmakers (judge and jury) and often
65
to the parties and witnesses themselves. 2 In the sort of cases discussed in

this Article, by contrast, the uncertainty pertains to the social meaning of a

display. This minor distinction gives no reason, however, to think that a pre

sumption would be any less appropriate.

As the doctrine of religious symbolism currently stands, the judge is left

to decide essentially in a vacuum what the social meaning of a display is

and whether that social meaning is sufficient to trigger Establishment Clause

concerns. In conditions of extreme indeterminacy, the judge is left without

any guidance with which to make this decision, except perhaps the general

rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Not only does this lack of

guidance render decisionmaking more difficult, it also masks the substantive

judgments that are really at work when a judge decides, purportedly as a
question of law, what the message of a display is. Starting with an initial

presumption at least brings the substantive bias (in this case, a legally

mandated bias in favor of plaintiffs) out into the open. It should make mani

fest and thereby stabilize some of the assumptions brought by the interpreter
66
to the act of interpreting a symbolic display. 2 A presumption would thus

add some determinacy to the jurisprudence without some of the problems
67
that a bright-line rule would entail. 2
Another purpose served by presumptions is counteracting systemic bi

ases or predispositions on the part of the factfinder that are determined, for

substantive or policy reasons, to be inimical to the goals of the judicial proc
68
These "cognitive filters, which are easily colored by social,
ess. 2

psychological, or dogmatic predispositions," if considered undesirable, may
263. Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncenainty, and Ambiguity in Modem Legal Dis
course, 17 HARV. J.L. & Pua. PoL' Y 627, 633 ( 1 994).
264.
( 1 992).
265.

Id. ; see also RICHARD H. GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE 20
Allen, supra note 263, at 633.

Cf Levinson, supra note 1 9 1 , at 1375-76 (noting that "the substantive judgments that
266.
determine, or are reflected in, the results of cases are buried in tacit framing decisions" and advocat
ing "bring[ing] these basic questions of goals and mechanisms to the surface by explicitly asking
what, exactly, constitutional norms are supposed to accomplish by way of improving the behavior of
government and how they might be designed and applied to realize these purposes").
267. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson ill, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 907, 909- 1 1 ( 1 992) (arguing that presumptions are a generally desirable mechanism
in law, because they negotiate between the harshness of a strict rule-based approach, with no excep
tions, and the unpredictability of an equity-based, case-by-case approach).
268. Of course, legal presumptions may serve a number of other purposes as well, including
offsetting systemic inequalities arising from parties' unequal access to information; favoring certain
substantive outcomes or classes of litigants; and shaping the underlying substantive law by creating
prima facie requirements for a particular class of cases. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 263, at 63 1-38;
Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and Change, 1 7
HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL' Y 759, 759 ( 1 994).
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b e counterbalanced b y presumptions i n favor o f the party who would not get
69
the benefit of the decisionmaker's predispositions. 2
Thus, a presumption against religious symbols on public property can

work as counterweight to the background noise, discussed above, that tends
to favor established and majoritarian religions. 210 As Linda Hamilton Krieger

has argued:

[O]ne important function performed by presumptions and burdens of proof
is precisely their capacity to constrain biases in fact-finder inference
stemming from the subtle or blatant operation of the traditional normative
regime. Legal adjudication necessarily requires fact finders to evaluate,
draw inferences from, and choose between competing factual accounts.
Where a member of a subordinated group seeks to enforce a law which di
verges from traditional social norms, individuals implicitly or explicitly
loyal to those traditional norms will tend to resolve factual ambiguities in
271
ways that favor the defense and disfavor the prosecution.

One might substitute for the phrases "competing factual accounts" and

"factual ambiguities" in the above paragraph the phrases "competing inter

pretations" and "interpretive ambiguities," in order to see more clearly the
relevance of Professor Krieger's observation to the religious symbol cases.

A presumption against religious symbols on public property could thus act
as a counterweight to the majoritarian bias and social background noise that
would otherwise dispose most judges, like the reasonable observer, to per

ceive no endorsement of religion arising from a display.

A presumption against religious symbols on public property would more

reliably counteract this majoritarian bias than the device, espoused by many

scholars, of urging judges simply to adopt the viewpoint of the reasonable

nonadherent.272 As outlined above, one of the principal interpretive difficul

ties in the religious symbol cases is the traditional, or majoritarian, bias that
is likely to infect the interpretive process. This bias is not likely to be con

strained simply by urging judges to adopt the perspective of the reasonable
nonadherent, since all of the context-based difficulties identified above will

still present themselves. Moreover, it is not clear exactly how a judge is to

place himself or herself in the position of the reasonable nonadherent. A

legal presumption against government-sponsored displays of religious sym

bolism, however, would counteract the potential majoritarian bias in a more
effective and, hopefully, predictable way than simply asking judges to step

outside their personal biases and walk in another's shoes for the course of

the judicial opinion.

269.

GASKINS, supra note 264, at 23.

270.

See supra text accompanying notes 170-175.

27 1 .
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in
Indian and American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 1 22 ( 1 999); see also GASKINS, supra
note 264, at 7 ("In general terms, burden-shifting indicates a challenge to established presump
tions-those elusive default settings that surround any rule-based procedure.").
272.

See supra notes 229-23 1 and accompanying text.
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Under the doctrinal change I propose, it would be possible to counteract

the presumption of unconstitutionality upon a showing by the government

that the message conveyed by a given display is unequivocally secular and

nonendorsing. To make such a showing, the governmental defendant would

have to point to contextual factors, as such defendants currently do, as well

as to evidence of societal consensus about the meaning of the display, since

these are the factors that, according to my analysis, produce social meaning.

If there is any doubt, however, the court would have to decide in favor of the

plaintiff challenging the display. Thus, the court would no longer be in the

position of having to decide what message the display conveys--0ften an
impossible task-before deciding whether it is constitutional; rather, the

presumption would mean that, if the court is uncertain as to the message

conveyed, the display must be found unconstitutional.

In the vast maj ority of cases, displays of religious symbolism would be

found to be unconstitutional; the presumption would function like a per se

rule against religious symbolism on public property except in the most ano

dyne contexts. A governmental defendant would likely be able to overcome

the presumption against religious displays where, for example, a medieval

art exhibition is concerned, should such a case arise. It will be able, in most

cases, to show that the museum context negates any potential endorsement
27
effect. 3 The B uddhist bell given to the City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, by

the government of Japan on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War
II might overcome the presumption as well. In both the museum example

and the Buddhist bell example, the defendant could probably point to a

number of contextual factors showing that no endorsement was present. In
addition, the level of societal consensus about the meaning of the display in
those cases is probably sufficiently high that the meaning will be clear.

In cases where the degree of consensus is lower, however, the deck will

be stacked against the government. This would produce dramatically differ

ent-but more consistent-results in the vast majority of creche, cross, and

menorah cases. Thus, neither the creche nor the menorah from the Allegheny
case would be permissible. The Latin cross in the Capitol Square case

would present a closer question, but also most likely would have to be dis

mantled under the presumption I propose, unless free speech concerns were
274
held to predominate.
Other cases in which the government has permitted
religious symbols in public forums might come out the other way, however,

273.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 ( 1 984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any
message of endorsement of that content."). But see Doe v. Small, 726 F. Supp. 7 1 3 (N.D. Ill . 1989)
(invalidating display of religious paintings in public park sponsored by a private group during the
Christmas holiday season), vacated, 964 F.2d 6 1 1 (7th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (reversing the district
court injunction as overbroad but not reversing finding of unconstitutionality).
274. While the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation is a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify content-based restrictions on
speech, see, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5 1 5 U.S. 753, 761 --62 ( 1 995), it
has never actually upheld a content-based speech restriction on this ground. Such a holding would
seem to imply that the Establishment Clause takes priority over the Free Speech Clause; as such, it
is understandable that the Court would avoid expressly articulating such a position.
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if the public nature of the forum and the lack of government sponsorship

were more evident. In a public forum having status and recognition analo
gous to that of Speaker's Comer in Hyde Park, London, which is universally

known as a bastion of free speech open to all comers, even an unattended
religious symbol (assuming unattended displays were permitted as a rule)

would probably be universally understood as an instance of private religious

speech, not government-sponsored religious endorsement.

Of course, courts actually applying the presumption might decide these

cases differently; indeed, this potential for continued indeterminacy in reli

gious symbol cases is perhaps the strongest critique of the solution I have

proposed. Although I do believe that a strong presumption against those

symbols on public property would be more easily administered and lead to

more consistent results than the current endorsement test, it clearly follows
from my analysis that indeterminacy is endemic to the enterprise of discern

ing the social meaning of religious symbol displays. It is not possible to

eradicate this indeterminacy entirely; thus, some hard cases will remain. It is

perhaps best, then, to understand the proposed presumption as a pragmatic
75
device,2 intended to minimize the problem of majoritarian bias and to pre

sent a default answer to the endorsement question, rather than as a definitive

resolution of the problem. It would be an improvement over the current cha

otic jurisprudence but not a resolution of the dilemma of context-based
meaning. Whereas under the current endorsement test, courts are required to

determine what message a display conveys in a vacuum using only the unre

liable concept of context as a guide, under the presumption, courts would
have to decide the case in favor of the plaintiff if there is any doubt.

One might further object that this presumption would result in courts'

holding unconstitutional an enormous quantity of symbolic speech that is

not, in fact, endorsing of religion. This is a legitimate concern, though I am
not certain-given my conclusion about the inherent indeterminacy of social

meaning in these cases-whether it is truly meaningful to say that the dis

plays that would be found unconstitutional are in fact nonendorsing. Even
taking this objection at face value, however, it seems to me that some degree

of overbreadth or prophylaxis is necessary in this class of Establishment

Clause cases to ensure that majoritarian biases are sufficiently constrained.

It is not unusual, after all, for courts to indulge presumptions in favor of
76
plaintiffs where constitutional rights are at stake. 2 Ultimately, however, it is
necessary to recognize that any solution to this problem will ultimately in

voke

substantive

judgments

about

the

meaning

and

scope

of

the

Establishment Clause. Those who disagree with the premises that the Estab

lishment Clause is intended to protect against symbolic government harms,

for example, will find a presumption against religious symbols on public
275.
Cf SMITH, supra note 154, at 122-27. Smith argues that the search for neutral constitu
tional principles to resolve the dilemma of church-state relations should be abandoned in favor of a
more modest and, it seems to me, pragmatic "historical" approach.
276. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 5 15 U.S. 8 1 9, 828 ( 1 995) ("Discrimina
tion against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional."); Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 5 12 U.S. 622, 641-643 ( 1 994).
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property to be particularly hard to swallow. A comprehensive theory of the
Establishment Clause and a defense of that theory, however, are well beyond
the scope of this Article.
A final criticism of the presumption is that it might simply shift the am
biguity, and the interpretive struggle, to the threshold question whether
something is or is not a religious symbol. As illustrated by the Alvarado and
Kunselman cases, however, while this determination is still context depend
ent, it will be less controversial in the vast majority of cases, since those
symbols that spawn the most litigation-such as creches, crosses, and me
277
norahs -are widely accepted as religious symbols. My proposed
incremental improvement, while far from perfect, will therefore bring some
regularity to the jurisprudence of religious symbolism in the majority of
cases, while demonstrating greater sensitivity to the majoritarian bias oth
278
erwise inherent in the interpretation of religious displays.
CONCLUSION
While the symbolic or "expressive" dimension of government conduct
has attracted a large amount of attention from constitutional scholars in re
cent years, the question of how the meaning of government conduct is to be
277.

See, e.g., Howard, supra note 66.

278.
Another potential solution would be to leave it to the courts, and ultimately to the Su
preme Court, to try to create a social consensus about the meaning of religious symbols by forging
an underlying consensus about the level of governmental involvement with religion that is accept
able in our society. Courts, as institutions that are bound up with the social power structure and
recognized as exercising legitimate power in our society-as possessors, in Pierre Bourdieu's iermi
nology, of enormous "symbolic capital"-have substantial power to shape our view of the world or
to legitimize a particular view of the world. Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of
Groups, 14 THEORY AND Soc'Y 723, 729--3 1 ( 1985). One solution to the problem of social meaning
in religious symbol cases might thus be to encourage the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a
greater number of cases, thereby using its considerable social capital to create consensus and to
regularize the jurisprudence in this area.
Yet this proposal, too, entails a host of objections. The principal one is perhaps that no good is
likely to arise from attempting to impose consensus upon a religiously pluralistic society, first, be
cause the Court is unlikely to succeed in doing so, and second, because any such attempts will likely
engender a sense of bitterness and alienation on those whose views are not adopted. In addition, the
very notion of consensus on religious matters runs contrary to the U.S. constitutional tradition that
recognizes religious diversity as a positive value and aims to respect that diversity. For all of these
reasons, attempting to create consensus in the realm of interpretation of religious symbols through
Supreme Court fiat is unlikely to produce satisfying results.
One might also suggest the inverse of this proposed solution-a more federalist or decentral
ized approach to religious symbolism whereby each community may interpret a symbolic display
for itself and no attempt is made to come up with any national consensus regarding what sorts of
displays are permissible. See Schragger, supra note 242, at 1 875-9 1 . From the perspective of lin
guistic theory, this approach has much to recommend it, as it plausibly suggests that different
communities of interpreters will understand symbolic displays differently. The objections to this
approach, however, are that it makes constitutional jurisprudence in this area even less predictable,
since what is constitutional in one community may be unconstitutional in another, and that it does
not resolve the problem of how to discern what a symbolic display "means" to a given community.
Courts might be able to find consensus more easily in a smaller, local community, as opposed to a
nationwide consensus, about the meaning of a display, but courts still risk, in the process, suppress
ing or ignoring the few dissenting voices within that local community. See id. at 1 880, 1 89 1
(recognizing the danger of "exclusionary harms to individual dissenters" within communities, but
arguing that these dangers are outweighed by other advantages of a localized approach).
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discerned has been largely ignored. In cases involving Establishment Clause

challenges to religious symbolism, interpretive difficulties are particularly
pronounced. Treating the display of religious symbols as an instance of lin

guistic communication and applying the lessons of modem speech act
theory helps to explain why the interpretation of religious symbol displays is

so difficult and has led to such inconsistent results. In particular, speech act

theory shows that the inevitable dependence of meaning on context, along

with the impossibility of fixing or formalizing context, renders the highly

context-dependent inquiry into the meaning of religious displays extremely

unstable. This instability is magnified in the religious symbol cases, because

subjective intent plays a relatively minor role and context a more important

role. Religious pluralism and the lack of societal consensus about the mean

ing of religious displays further aggravate the interpretive difficulties. To the
extent that any societal consensus regarding the meaning of religious dis

plays can be identified, moreover, it tends to embody the majoritarian
perspective.

I have suggested that the problems I have identified cannot truly be

solved-they are endemic to the interpretation of religious symbolism and

perhaps to the interpretation of social meaning in general. I have argued,

however, that one doctrinal innovation-a presumption against the display

of religious symbols on public property-might lend a degree of predictabil

ity and minimize the majoritarian bias inherent in the interpretation of
religious symbols. I believe that this solution is preferable to asking courts
to assume the perspective of the reasonable nonadherent, as many commen

tators have done, since, according to speech act theory, many of the same

interpretive difficulties will arise whether courts are using the perspective of
the reasonable adherent or the reasonable nonadherent. At the same time,

however, the interpretive problems posed by religious symbolism will not

entirely go away. They are inherent in any context-dependent inquiry into
meaning and, indeed, as complex as language itself.
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